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Disclosure and Individual Rights:
Influencing the Legislative Process
Under the Political Reform
Act of 1974
Concern over the deleterious effect that unchecked lobbying activities can
have on the legislative process has been met with a varied regulatory
response from the federal and state governments.' The varying degrees of
control exerted over lobbying activities by the state and federal legislatures
indicates,2 at least in part, the difficulty present in regulating and restricting
activities that lie so near the heart of a democratic government. 3 This
difficulty stems from the inherent conflict that results when the individual's
rights of free expression and redress of grievances fail to form a smooth
interface with the state's interest in the purity of its governmental function.
The interest asserted by the state is the interest of each citizen since it is the
citizen's representative body that is being protected from the abuse of
influence exerted by lobbyists or special interest groups. Thus, the individu-
al's interest as a represented citizen may conflict with the exercise of his first
amendment rights.
The Political Reform Act of 19744 [hereinafter referred to as the Political
Reform Act or the Act] contains California's most recent legislation regulat-
ing lobbying activities. To date, the California courts have not been faced
with determining the constitutionality of the Political Reform Act's balance
of the state's interest in open government and protection of the individual's
first amendment rights. The Political Reform Act has significantly extended
regulatory controls over activities intended to influence legislative decision-
making. This extension requires a consideration of the Act's effect on
individual rights of expression, petition, association and privacy.
The Political Reform Act uses public disclosure as the primary method of
regulating political activity. 5 Public disclosure, in many circumstances, has
1. See generally E. LANE, LOBBYING AND THE LAW (1964) [hereinafter cited as LANE].
2. LANE, supra note 1, at 47-106.
3. "Clearly, the right to speak on political questions and the allied right to petition, both
of which are protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, are basic under the traditional
American view of constitutional government." Nutting, Freedom of Silence: Constitutional
Protection Against Governmental Intrusions in Political Affairs, 47 MICH. L. REV. 181, 211
(1948).
4. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§81000-91014.
5. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§86107, 86109 (reports), 81008 (all reports filed pursuant to the
Political Reform Act become public records). Cf. Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610,
625-30 (1976) (discussion of required registration resulting in disclosure).
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the effect of chilling the exercise of first amendment rights. 6 Influencing
legislative or administrative action involves the exercise of the rights of
expression, petition and in some cases the right of association. Because
disclosure has an inhibitory effect on the exercise of these rights, it is
necessary to analyze the constitutional propriety of the Political Reform
Act's disclosure requirements. The Act requires disclosure by three different
individuals; these are the lobbyist, the employer of a lobbyist, and any other
person attempting to influence legislative decisions by engaging in certain
activities. The last of these, the person who attempts to influence legislative
decisions but is not a lobbyist or employer, is the subject of this comment.
This person, for the purpose of the comment, will be referred to as an
Influencer to distinguish him from the lobbyist and the employer.
In discussing the regulation of the Influencer, the following format will be
used. First, the lobbying regulations of the Political Reform Act will be
explained for purposes of identifying the Influencer and the position held by
him in the Act's regulatory scheme. Second, the constitutional test applic-
able to indirect infringements of first amendment rights will be discussed. It
will be determined that the Act regulates speech and not conduct, thus
necessitating the application of a balancing test to determine whether the
state has a sufficient interest to require disclosure. Third, the state's interests
in regulation of lobbying activities and the first amendment rights of the
Influencer will be delineated. These rights and interests will then be bal-
anced to determine whether the Act's disclosure requirements are a permis-
sible regulation of the Influencer. Finally, the Influencer's right to privacy
under the California Constitution will be discussed in reference to both the
Act's required disclosure of financial transactions and maintenance of dis-
closed information in a public record.
REGULATION OF LOBBYING IN CALIFORNIA
It was not until 1949 that the California Legislature enacted regulations
governing lobbyists, or legislative advocates as they were then termed.7 The
6. The California Supreme Court stated recently:
In a line of cases stretching over the past two decades, the United States Supreme
Court has repeatedly recognized that to compel an individual to disclose his political
ideas or affiliations to the government is to deter the exercise of First Amendment
rights.
White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757,767-68,533 P.2d 222,229, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94, 100(1975). See also
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 68 (1975). For a general discussion of the chilling effect, see
Note, The Chilling Effect in Constitutional Law, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 809 (1969).
7. The 1949 regulations were contained in CAL. GOV'T CODE §§9900-9908, amended to
add §§9909-9911 in 1950. CAL. Gov'r CODE §§9900-9911 were repealed with the passage of the
Political Reform Act of 1974, June 4, 1974.
The California Constitution previously contained the provision:
Any person who seeks to influence the vote of a member of, the legislature by
bribery, promise of reward, intimidation, or other dishonest means shall be guilty of
lobbying, which is hereby declared to be a felony.
CAL. CONsT. art. IV, §35 (repealed Nov. 8, 1966). The term lobbying has been used, in the past,
to refer to illegal activity intended to influence legislative decisions. This, however, is no longer
the commonly understood meaning of lobbying. A similar provision, but without the reference
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California regulations were patterned after the Federal Regulation of Lobby-
ing Act8 and, unfortunately, shared that Act's defects. Among these defects
were the lack of a clear definition of lobbying activity and the failure to
provide for an effective enforcement procedure. 9 The California Legislature
amended the state's regulations on a number of occasions, but failed to
make any substantive changes. 10 In response to this legislative inaction and
the heightened public concern over exposing abuses within the governmen-
tal process, the California voters, by initiative,II passed the Political Reform
Act of 1974 and a comprehensive reform of the state's political process
became law.
A. The Political Reform Act of 1974
The Political Reform Act of 1974 contains a comprehensive package of
political reform legislation touching many political activities within the
state.' 2 Chapter 6 of the Act specifically covers lobbying activities and has
resulted in a major revision of California's lobbying regulations. 13 Chapter 6
both tightens controls that were present in the old law and extends control to
activities that had previously gone unchecked.
A major procedural change is the creation of the Fair Political Practices
Commission14 [hereinafter referred to as the FPPC] which has the primary
responsibility for carrying out the purposes of the Act. 15 Specifically, the
to lobbying, is now found in CAL. CONST. art. IV, §15. CAL. PEN. CODE §85 also makes bribery of
a legislative official a statutory crime.
8. 2 U.S.C. §§261-270 (1958) (originally enacted as Fed. Reg. of Lobbying Act of 1946, 60
Stat. 839 (1946)).
9. See, e.g., Futor, An Analysis of the Federal Lobbying Act, 10 FED. BAR. J. 366 (1949);
Kennedy, Congressional Lobbies: A Chronic Problem Re-examined, 45 GEo. L.J. 535 (1957);
Comment, Public Disclosure of Lobbyists Activities, 38 FORDHAM L. REV. 524 (1970); Note,
Federal Regulation of Lobbying Activities-Constitutionality and Future Application, 49 Nw.
U.L. REV. 807 (1954); Comment, Improving the Legislative Process, 56 YALE L.J. 304 (1947);
Note, The Federal Lobbying Act of 1946, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 98 (1947).
10. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§9900-9911, as amended, CAL. STATS. 1949, Ex. Sess., c. 4, at
243; CAL. STATS. 1968, c. 312, at 680; CAL. STATS. 1969, c. 122, at 257; CAL. STATS. 1969, c. 606,
at 1242; CAL. STATS. 1970, c. 801, at 1517-21. See generally REPORTS OF ASSEMBLY INTERIM
COMMITTEE ON LEGISLATIVE REPRESENTATION, vol. II, no. 1, in 2 APPENDIX TO JOURNAL OFTHE
CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY 1 (1957 Reg. Sess.); REPORTS OF ASSEMBLY INTERIM COMMITTEE ON
LEGISLATIVE REPRESENTATION, vol. II, no. 2, in I APPENDIX TO JOURNAL OF THE CALIFORNIA
ASSEMBLY 1 (1961 Reg. Sess.); REPORTS OF ASSEMBLY INTERIM COMMITTEE ON LEGISLATIVE
REPRESENTATION, Vol. II, no. 3, in 1 APPENDIX TO JOURNAL OF THE CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY 1
(1963 Reg. Sess.).
11. The Political Reform Act of 1974 was passed by 68.9 percent of the statewide vote on
June 4, 1974. STATE OF CALIFORNIA, STATEMENT OF VOTE, PRIMARY ELECTION JUNE 4, 1974 at 40
(1974) (compiled by Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Secretary of State).
12. For a discussion of other provisions of the Political Reform Act of 1974, see Com-
ment, Proposition 9 and Conflicts of Interest: Scrambling to Close the Barn Door, 7 PAC. L.J.
847 (1976); Comment, Expenditure Limitations In Campaigns For Statewide Office In Califor-
nia, 6 PAC. L.J. 631 (1975).
13. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§86100-86300.
14. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§83100-83122. Under the previous regulations, a joint committee of
the legislature was established to receive the lobbyist reports. This joint committee, however,
did not otherwise exercise the powers of a regulatory commission. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§9900(d),
9904, 9906, 9909 (repealed by Initiative Measure, June 4, 1974).
15. CAL. GOV'T CODE.§83111.
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FPPC has the authority to give advisory opinions, 16 enact rules to further the
purposes of the Act,' 7 investigate possible violations, 18 and act as the
primary civil prosecutor. 19 Substantively Chapter 6, while requiring lob-
byists and their employers to meet stricter reporting requirements, extends
control over activities and individuals previously unregulated. The major
substantive changes include the following. First, lobbying activities directed
at the quasi-legislative functions of state agencies are now included in the
regulations. 20 Second, a person who is not a lobbyist and who uses only
personal funds for influencing purposes is now subject to regulation, if the
statutory requirements for reporting are otherwise met. 21 Last, more infor-
mation relating to lobbying efforts must now be reported by lobbyists,22
employers and others influencing legislative action. 23 It should also be noted
that indirect as well as direct influencing activities must be reported. 24
B. Chapter 6 and the Regulation of Lobbying Activity
A major difficulty in drafting lobbying legislation is the determination of
what activities constitute lobbying. The term "lobbying," while having a
popular connotation, has no single definition under the regulations of vari-
ous states? 5 Black's Law Dictionary defines lobbying as personal solicita-
tion of legislators by one who either misrepresents the interests he is
promoting or is paid to use means not addressed to the legislator's judgment
alone. 26 This definition excludes from lobbying the collection of facts, the
preparation of arguments, and the submission of these facts and arguments
to the legislator.27 The dictionary definition would not include the individual
16. CAL. GOV'T CODE §83114.
17. CAL. GOV'T CODE §83112.
18. CAL. GOV'T CODE §83115. Under the previous regulations, enforcement was left to the"appropriate law enforcement officers." CAL. GOV'T CODE §9909(7) (repealed by Initiative
Measure, June 4, 1974).
19. CAL. GOV'T CODF §91001(b).
20. See CAL. Gov'T CODE §§82039, 86100-86107 (lobbyist), 82045, 86108-86109 (employer
and Influencer). For the definition of quasi-legislative administrative action, see CAL. GOV'T
CODE §82002; 2 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §18202. Cf. 2 F.P.P.C. Ops. 54 (No. 75-042, April 22, 1976); 1
F.P.P.C. Ops. 46 (No. 75-031, July 2, 1975) (discussion of quasi-legislative administrative
action).
Under the old law, only influencing efforts directed at the state legislature and the Governor
were regulated. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§9905-9906 (repealed by Initiative Measure June 4, 1974).
21. See text accompanying notes 43-63 infra. The previous regulations were determined
to be inapplicable to a person if funds were neither solicited nor collected for the purpose of
influencing. Thus, persons using only personal funds for influencing activities were not re-
quired to file reports. Op. LEG. COUNSEL, 1 JOURNAL OF CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY 4692, 4693 (1959
Reg. Sess.).
22. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §86107.
23. See CAL. GOv'T CODE §86109.
24. See CAL. Gov'T CODE §82045(e). This section contains the provisions regulating
indirect lobbying activities. Similar provisions under the old law were found at CAL. Gov'T
CODE §9905(b) (repealed by Initiative Measure, June 4, 1974).
25. See LANE, supra note 1, at 47-106. Lane has categorized the lobbying regulations of
the various states into five basic types. The five types of regulations define lobbying as: corrupt
or illegal solicitation, claimed influence (i.e., beyond argumentation on the merits), appeals to
unreason, the promotion of private pecuniary interest or any type of influence directed at
legislators. See id. at 47-57.
26. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1086 (4th ed. 1968).
27. Id.
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promotion of interests or beliefs when directed to the merits of the individu-
al's position alone.28 When, however, a person is employed to promote
another's interest, or an individual uses means not limited to an appeal to the
reason and judgement of the legislator, he is engaging in lobbying.29 An
examination of Chapter 6 of the Political Reform Act reveals that the Act
regulates activities not included within the common definition of lobbying.
Chapter 6 has gone beyond requiring that only lobbying activity be reported,
and has extended regulation to include influencing activity.
30
Chapter 6 regulates the influencing activities of three types of individuals.
These include the lobbyist, 31 the employer of a lobbyist 32 [hereinafter
referred to as employer] and the Influencer. 33 It is important to later analysis
of the Influencer disclosure provisions to understand the position of the
Influencer in relation to the entire regulatory environment of Chapter 6. This
will require a brief discussion of the Chapter 6 provisions regulating the
lobbyist and employer as well as the Influencer.
Under Chapter 6 a lobbyist is a person who receives compensation to
directly influence legislative or administrative action.34 The lobbyist is paid
to advocate the views of another before legislative or administrative bodies
for the purpose of influencing decisions to favor the employer's interests.
The FPPC has defined a lobbyist in terms of the minimum amount of time
spent on, and compensation received for, lobbying activities.35 A person
who receives no compensation for attempting to influence is not a lobbyist
under the Act.36 Once a person employed to influence legislative decisions
has exceeded the time or compensation minimums, however, he is subject to
the lobbyist provisions of Chapter 6. A lobbyist is required to register37 and
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See text accompanying notes 49-52 infra.
31. CAL. GOV'T CODE §82039. For text of this subsection, see note 34 infra.
32. CAL. GOV'T CODE §86108(a). For text of this subsection, see note 40 infra.
33. CAL. GOV'T CODE §86108(b). For text of this subsection, see text accompanying note
44 infra.
34. CAL. Gov'T CODE §82039 defines a lobbyist as:
any person who is employed or contracts for economic consideration, other than
reimbursement for reasonable travel expenses, to communicate directly or through
his agents with any elective state official, agency official or legislative official for the
purpose of influencing legislative or administrative action, if a substantial or regular
portion of the activities for which he receives consideration is for the purpose of
influencing legislative or administrative action. No person is a lobbyist by reason of
activities described in Section 86300.
A person who directly supervises and gives orders to a lobbyist becomes a lobbyist and the
other person becomes his agent. Id.; 2 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §18239(c). See I F.P.P.C. Ops. 50,52
(No. 75-035, July 2, 1975).
For opinions discussing the requirements for lobbyists, see, e.g., 2 F.P.P.C. Ops. 84, 90 (No.
75-099, July 6, 1976); 2 F.P.P.C. Ops. 54, 55-56 (No. 75-042, April 22, 1976); 1 F.P.P.C. Ops. 64
(No. 75-054, July 2, 1975); 1 F.P.P.C. OPs. 59, 60 (No. 75-040, July 2, 1975); 1 F.P.P.C. OPs. 50,
52-53 (No. 75-035, July 2, 1975); 1 F.P.P.C. OPs. 10, 11-12 (No. 75-006, May 1, 1975).
CAL. GOV'T CODE §86300 excludes certain persons from the requirements of Chapter 6, See
note 45 infra.
35. 2 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §18239.
36. See I F.P.P.C. Ops. 195, 195-96 (No. 75-156, Dec. 3, 1975); 1 F.P.P.C. Ops. 140, 142
(No. 75-003, Oct. 23, 1975).
37. CAL. Gov'T CODE §86100.
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to report receipts, expenditures and financial transactions with specified
state officials.38 Further, the lobbyist is prohibited from making a contribu-
tion to a state candidate and from giving a gift of more than ten dollars in
any one month to specified state officials. 39
The employer of a lobbyist is a person who hires or contracts for the
services of a lobbyist!n0 Any individual or association paying a lobbyist to
represent special interests and influence legislative or administrative actions
is an employer under Chapter 6 and is required to report all payments made
to lobbyists as well as payments made independently to influence legislative
or administrative action.4 In addition to payments made to influence legis-
lative decisions, the employer is required to report transactions of $1,000 or
more between himself and a state official or the state official's business, and
to report contributions made to a candidate for a state office,42 Beyond these
reporting requirements, the employer is not required to register and is not
subject to any prohibitions under Chapter 6.
The Influencer disclosure provisions in Chapter 6 are, for the most part,
distinct from the lobbyist or employer provisions. 43 Chapter 6 defines an
Influencer as follows:
Any person who directly or indirectly makes payments to influ-
38. CAL. GOV'T CODE §86107.
39. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§86200-86205. The prohibition against a lobbyist making a
contribution, CAL. GOV'T CODE §86202, also prohibits a lobbyist from arranging a contribution.
The FPPC has interpreted "arrange" to include a lobbyist advising his employer to make a
contribution. 1 F.P.P.C. Ops. 86 (No. 75-098, July 3, 1975). This interpretation was challenged
in Institute of Gov't Advocates v. Younger, No. C 1100 52 (L.A. Super. Ct. Feb. 19, 1975)
resulting in an injunction against enforcement by the FPPC. The FPPC, however, has appealed
this ruling. Institute of Gov't Advocates v. Younger, No. 48818 (Ct. App., 2d App. Dist., filed
Aug. 16, 1976). For FPPC opinion concerning contributions, see, e.g., 1 F.P.P.C. Ops. 28, 29-30
(No. 75-004, June 18, 1975) (discusses contribution prohibitions). A lobbyist is not prohibited
from participating in campaign activities unrelated to contributions. Id. at 34 n.6; see 2 F.P.P.C.
Ops. 127 (No. 75-175, Aug. 3, 1976); 2 F.P.P.C. Ops. 70, 71-72 (No. 75-187, June 1, 1976); 1
F.P.P.C. Ops. 62 (No. 75-053, July 2, 1975). For FPPC opinions discussing gifts, see, e.g., I
F.P.P.C. Ops. 107 (No. 75-067, Aug. 7, 1975); 1 F.P.P.C. Ops. 99 (No. 75-047, Aug. 7, 1975); 1
F.P.P.C. Ops. 97 (No. 75-046, Aug. 7, 1975); 1 F.P.P.C. Ops. 82 (No. 75-014, July 3, 1975); 1
F.P.P.C. Ops. 42 (No. 75-028, No. 75-030, July 2, 1975); 1 F.P.P.C. Ops. 37 (No. 75-023, June
18, 1975). "The prohibition on gifts from lobbyists to officials is intended to prevent the official
from feeling under a personal obligation to the lobbyist which might consciously or subcon-
sciously effect the official's decisions." I F.P.P.C. Ops. 82, 84 (No. 75-014, July 3, 1975).
40. CAL. GOV'T CODE §86108(a). An employer is "[a]ny person who employs or contracts
for the services of one or more lobbyists, whether independently or jointly with other persons
. Id. For an opinion discussing employers, see, e.g., 2 F.P.P.C. OPs. 65 (No. 75-172,
June 1, 1976).
41. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§86109(c), 82045.
42. CAL. Gov'T CODE §86109(d), (e), (f).
43. While the Chapter 6 reporting requirements applicable to the employer and Influencer
are identical, the activities bringing these persons under the Chapter's control are quite differ-
ent. The employer is subject to the Chapter because he has hired a lobbyist. The Influencer
comes under the control of the Chapter because he has made "payments to influence legislative
or administrative action." CAL. Gov'T CODE §82045. An employer who makes these same
payments, unrelated to the activities of the lobbyist he has employed, has arguably become
both an employer and an Influencer. The employer, however, is already required to report
payments made to influence legislative or administrative action under CAL. GOV'T CODE
§86108(b). Therefore, the employer must report the same types of influencing activities as the
Influencer. The approach taken in this comment will be to consider the employer and the
Influencer as two different individuals, while at the same time recognizing that the employer
may participate in the same activities engaged in by the Influencer.
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ence legislative or administrative action of two hundred fifty dol-
lars ($250) or more in value in any month, unless all of the pay-
ments are of the type described in Section 82045(c). 44
An Influencer may be an individual spending his own funds to advocate
personal interests and beliefs since the Act broadly defines "person" to
include both individuals and organizations.4 Both a private citizen and a
large company or association may be Influencers. Further, an Influencer
may be an ad hoc community group as well as an association consisting of
companies or other associations. The critical factor in determining whether
one is an Influencer is the activity in which the person is engaged and not the
person's character or identity; the person must make a "payment to influ-
ence legislative or administrative action.'"4 The payment may be a direct
payment or it may be an indirect payment by the Influencer to another.
47 Of
the four types of payments applying to the Influencer, two are made
exclusively for direct or indirect influencing activities. 48 The first is a
44. CAL. Gov'T CODE §86108(b). For FPPC opinions discussing this subsection, see, e.g.,
2 F.P.P.C. Ops. 105 (No. 75-169, July 6, 1976); 1 F.P.P.C. Ops. 165 (No. 75-063, Nov. 4, 1975); 1
F.P.P.C. Ops. 140, 143-44 (No. 75-003, Oct. 23, 1975); 1 F.P.P.C. Ops. 59, 61 (No. 75-040, July
2, 1975).
45. CAL. GOV'T CODE §82047 defines a person as:
an individual, proprietorship, firm, partnership, joint venture, syndicate, business
trust, company, corporation, association, committee, and any other organization or
group of persons acting in concert.
See I F.P.P.C. Ops. I (No. 75-044, Feb. 21, 1975). The FPPC decided that local government
agencies are "persons" under Chapter 6 and may become Influencers. Id. at 8-9.
The Act specifically excludes certain persons from the requirements of Chapter 6. State
elected officials, state employees acting in their official capacities, the press, and persons
representing a bona fide religion are all exempt from complaince with Chapter 6 in certain
cases. CAL. Gov'T CODE §86300.
46. CAL. Gov'T CODE §82045 provides:
"Payment to influence legislative or administrative action" means any of the follow-
ing types of payment:
(a) Direct or indirect payment to a lobbyist whether for salary, fee, compensation
for expenses, or any other purpose, by a person employing or contracting for the
services of the lobbyist separately or jointly with other persons;
(b) Payment in support or assistance of a lobbyist or his activities, including but
not limited to the direct payment of expenses incurred at the request or suggestion of
the lobbyist;
(c) Payment which directly or indirectly benefits any elective state official, legis-
lative official or agency official or a member of the immediate family of any such
official;
(d) Payment, including compensation, payment or reimbursement for the ser-
vices, time or expenses of an employee, for or in connection with direct communica-
tion with any elective state official, legislative official or agency official;
(e) Payment for or in connection with soliciting or urging other persons to enter
into direct communication with any elective state official, legislative official or
agency official.
The FPPC has stated that these "activities may be termed lobbying activities under the Political
Reform Act." I F.P.P.C. Ops. 59, 61 (No. 75-040, July 2, 1975).
47. To avoid possible confusion, the reader should be aware that the terms direct and
indirect are used to characterize two very different events. First, the manner in which a
payment is made may be either direct or indirect. CAL. GOV'T CoDo §86108(b). Second, the
influencing activity itself may either be direct influencing, CAL. Gov'T CODE §82045(d), or it
may take the form of indirect or grass roots influencing, CAL. GOV'T CODE §82045(e).
48. The four types of payments that concern Influencers are those found in CAL. GOV'T
CODE §82045 (b), (c), (d), and (e). The first two types involve payments either in support of the
activities of a lobbyist, CAL. GOV'T CODE §82045(b), or payments for the benefit of an official,
CAL. GOV'T CODE §82045(c), and are concerned with activities extending beyond independent
efforts solely for purposes of communication by an Influencer. For a discussion of these
payments, see text accompanying notes 150-152 infra.
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payment made "for or in connection with" direct communication with a
state official.49 This activity may be termed direct influencing if the pay-
ment is made to prepare, facilitate or carry out direct communication with a
state official.50 This activity may be similar to traditional lobbying; how-
ever, in this situation the Influencer or his agent, and not a lobbyist, is the
person engaged in such activity. The second type of payment concerns
indirect or grass roots influencing. This is defined as a payment made "for
or in connection with soliciting or urging others to enter into direct com-
munication" with an official.51 Such payments can be made for activities
ranging from large scale publicity campaigns to taking an ad in a newspaper
or printing handbills urging readers to enter into direct communication with
a state official. While direct communication with a legislator to influence
legislative action may clearly be considered lobbying, indirect activities are
also intended to influence legislative decisions. Although a media campaign
directed at the community to generate pressure on the legislature has not
been traditionally thought of as lobbying, this activity may have greater
effect on legislative decision-making than traditional one-on-one lobbying.
If such an activity has the result of distorting the legislative perception of
actual public interest in a matter, it makes little difference that the influence
exerted was not a direct communication by the Influencer. This type of
activity may have the effect of improperly influencing legislative
decisions.
52
The direct and indirect payments described above are aggregated with
payments made in support of a lobbyist, and payments benefiting an offi-
cial, to calculate the $250 threshold amount that subjects an individual to the
disclosure requirements of Chapter 6. 53 Thus, the actual payment made to
engage in either direct or indirect influencing may be much less than $250,
yet the person may be subject to the provisions of Chapter 6 if other types of
payments are also made.
Like the employer, the Influencer is not subject to the prohibitions
49. A state official includes agency officials, elected state officers, and legislative offi-
cials. An agency official is defined as:
any member, officer, employee or consultant of any state agency who as part of his
official responsibilities participates in any administrative action in other than a purely
clerical, secretarial or ministerial capacity.
CAL. GOV'T CODE §82004. An elective state office is defined as:
the office of Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Attorney General, Controller, Secret-
ary of State, Treasurer, Superintendent of Public Instruction, member of the Legisla-
ture and member of the State Board of Equalization.
CAL. GOV'T CODE §82024. A legislative official is defined as:
any employee or consultant of the Legislature whose duties are not solely secretarial,
clerical or manual.
CAL. GOV'T CODE §82038.
50. CAL. GOV'T CODE §82045(d).
51. CAL. GOV'T CODE §82045(e). For text of this subsection see note 46 supra.
52. Some commentators consider indirect lobbying efforts to be as potentially harmful as
direct lobbying activities. See Nutting, Freedom of Silence: Intrusions in Political Affairs, 47
MICH. L. REv. 181, 209-13 (1948).
53. 2 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §18621.
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imposed on the lobbyist.54 The Influencer is required only to file a report of
activities and expenditures. 55 Since the report becomes a public record,56 the
identity of the Influencer is disclosed, and if the Influencer is an industry,
54. "Persons" who qualify under Section 86108 [employers and Influencers] are not
in any manner prohibited from communicating with state officials or attempting to
influence legislative or administrative action. "Lobbyists" under the Political Re-
form Act are prohibited from certain activities by Sections 86202, 86203, and 86205,
but neither these nor any other substantive regulations are imposed on persons
qualifying under Section 86108. The only provisions affecting such persons are those
requiring disclosure of expenditures and other information relative to lobbying
activities.
1 F.P.P.C. OPs., 7 (No. 75-044, Feb. 21, 1975).
55. CAL. GOV'T CODE §86109 provides:
Every person described in Section 86108 shall file periodic reports containing:
(a) The name, business address and telephone number of the person making the
report;
(b) Information sufficient to identify the nature and interests of the filer,
including;
(1) If the filer is an individual, the name and address of his employer, if any, or
his principal place of business if he is self-employed, and a description of the
business activity in which he or his employer is engaged;
(2) If the filer is a business entity, a description of the business activity in which it
is engaged;
(3) If the filer is an industry, trade or professional association, a description of
the industry, trade or profession which it represents including a specific description
of any portion or faction of the industry, trade or profession which the association
exclusively or primarily represents and, if the association has no more than fifty
members, the names of the members; and
(4) If the filer is not an individual, business entity or industry, trade or profession-
al association, a statement of the person's nature and purposes, including a descrip-
tion of any industry, trade, profession or other group with a common economic
interest which the person principally represents or from which its membership or
financial support is principally derived.
The information required by this subsection (b) need be stated only in the first
report filed during a calendar year, except to reflect changes in the information
previously reported.
(c) The total amount of payments to influence legislative and administrative
action during the period, and the name and address of each person to whom such
payments in an aggregate value of twenty-five dollars ($25) or more have been made
during the period by the filer, together with the date, amount, and a description of
consideration received for each such expenditure, and the name of the beneficiary of
each expenditure if other than the filer or the payee.
(d) The name and official position of each elective state official, legislative
official and agency official, the name of each state candidate, and the name of each
member of the immediate family of such official or candidate with whom the filer has
engaged in an exchange of money, goods, services or anything of value and the
nature and date of each such exchange and the monetary values exchanged, if the fair
market value of either side of the exchange exceeded one thousand dollars ($1,000);
(e) The name and address of any business entity in which the person making the
report knows or has reason to know that an elective state official, legislative official,
agency official or state candidate is a proprietor, partner, director, officer, manager,
or has more than a fifty percent ownership interest, with whom the person making the
report has engaged in an exchange or exchanges of money, goods, services or
anything of value and the nature and date of each such exchange and the monetary
value exchanged, if the total value of such exchanges is one thousand dollars ($1,000)
or more in a calendar year;
(f) The date and amount of each contribution made by the filer and the name of
the recipient of each contribution;
(g) A specific description of legislative or administrative action which the person
making the report has attempted to influence;
(h) The name of each lobbyist employed or retained by the person making the
report, together with the total amount paid to each lobbyist and the portion of that
amount which was paid for specified purposes, including salary, fees, general ex-
penses and any special expenses;
(i) Any other information required by the Commission consistent with the pur-
poses and provisions of this chapter.
56. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §81008.
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trade or professional association, it may have to disclose its membership. 57
Otherwise, any identification of an Influencer will be made in the report by
that Influencer.58 Chapter 6 requires that the report identify the legislative or
administrative action that is being influenced and the payments made in that
effort. 59 Finally, the report must contain a description of any contribution
the Influencer has made to a political candidate60 as well as any private
transaction of $1,000 or more between the Influencer and a state official or
such official's private business in a period of one year.
61
Chapter 6, in simplistic terms, has defined a lobbyist as a person paid to
influence legislative decisions, the employer as one using the services of a
lobbyist, and the Influencer as a distinct class of persons that individually
spend money to influence the legislative process. Influencers can have
diverse characteristics since their activities may take the form of long range
influencing efforts or may be single occurrences. The Influencer's activities
may be very dissimilar to those of the lobbyist and employer or the Influ-
encer may engage in activities that are indistinguishable from the type of
special interest advocacy that is associated with the employer and lobbyist.
An Influencer, for example, may be an association or a company using its
employees to compile data in support of legislation in which it has an
interest. This information will be presented directly to the legislature, again
by the association or company employees. The association or company, by
spreading the time spent on influencing activities among a number of
employees, can avoid having any one employee exceed the time and com-
pensation thresholds for a lobbyist and thus, while engaging in a large
influencing effort, avoid the reporting requirements for lobbyists and emp-
loyers. 62 The association or company, without being identified, could also
engage in indirect efforts through a "front" organization that supports
legislation in which the association or company has an interest. Without
reporting requirements for Influencers, these types of lobbying pressures
would go undetected.
On the other hand, an Influencer may be an individual advocating his own
interests and beliefs, and his reasons for seeking legislative action may be
57. CAL. GOV'T CODE §86109(b)(3). For text of this subsection, see note 55 supra.
58. CAL. GOV'T CODE §86109(b)(4). For text of this subsection, see note 55 supra.
59. CAL. Gov'T CODE §86109(c), (g). For text of this subsection, see note 55 supra.
60. CAL. Gov'T CODE §86109(f. For text of this subsection, see note 55 supra.
The FPPC has limited the scope of transactions that must be reported by the Influencer by
excluding transactions where the Influencer offers goods or services on identical terms to the
public at large. This section also applies to the lobbyist and employer. 2 CAL. ADMIN. CODE
§18650. A further limitation excludes from the reporting requirements transactions with an
agency official where the Influencer lobbyist or employer have not attempted to influence the
agency of that official. 2 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §18600.
61. CAL. Gov'T CODE §86109 (d), (e). For text of this subsection, see note 55 supra.
A transaction can take many forms. For example, if an Influencer was liable to a state official
for damages due to an auto accident, a reportable transaction would occur if the Influencer was
an active participant in the settlement of the claim. See I F.P.P.C. Ops. 13, 14-15 (No. 75-015,
May 1, 1975).
62. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§86107 (lobbyists), 86109 (employers).
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purely personal. The individual may engage in direct communication with
legislative officials, making expenditures for purposes of collecting infor-
mation and communicating with these officials, or his advocacy may be
directed at the community, urging communication with the state govern-
ment. In either case, the individual could easily spend the threshold amount
and become subject to reporting requirements as an Influencer.
To deny the importance of exposing the influence exerted by the associa-
tion or company in the first example, simply because no lobbyist partici-
pated, is unrealistic. 63 In the second example where the individual is ad-
vocating personal interests, however, it is important to look closely at the
effect that a state disclosure law will have upon the exercise of an individu-
al's first amendment rights in influencing legislative matters. Regulation of
all persons attempting to influence the legislative process will certainly have
a greater effect in preventing abuses of influence than would a more limited
disclosure requirement but such a regulation may also have the effect of
deterring some persons from advocating their beliefs to state officials.
As has been discussed, the definition of an Influencer subjects a wide
range of individuals and associations to Chapter 6 disclosure requirements.
To discuss the constitutional issues raised by these disclosure requirements,
a division will be made among the various types of Influencers. First,
individuals that act as Influencers will be discussed, with consideration
given to both their direct and indirect attempts to influence. Second, associ-
ations or groups acting as Influencers will be examined insofar as individual
members are required to meet reporting requirements when they engage in
influencing efforts through such groups. Before the disclosure requirements
of each of these Influencer groups can be subjected to constitutional
analysis, however, it is necessary to examine the applicable constitutional
principles.
CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE CHAPTER 6 INFLUENCER REGULATIONS
The United States Supreme Court has noted that "[c]ompetition in ideas
and governmental policies is at the core . . . of the First Amendment
freedoms. "64 Since an Influencer must disclose information regarding ac-
tivities engaged in to support or oppose legislative action, the disclosure
requirements imposed by Chapter 6 operate in an area protected by the first
63. A check, by the author, of reports filed with the Secretary of State by persons filing as
Influencers revealed that most were professional, trade or industrial associations either con-
cerned with specific current legislation, or conducting ongoing influencing efforts without using
the services of a lobbyist. In many cases, considerable sums were spent in these efforts. Many
of these persons had originally filed as employers or lobbyists until they realized that they did
not meet the Chapter's criteria requiring such filing. See notes 34-42 supra. The dearth of
reports by non-professional Influencers, either associations or individuals, may indicate a
general unawareness of this requirement on the part of persons who do not, as a matter of
course, engage in influencing activities.
64. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968).
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amendment. 65 The first amendment freedoms protected from abridgment by
the federal government are protected from similar abridgment by the states
via the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 66 While the Califor-
nia courts could be more protective of these rights under the California
Constitution,67 to date this has not been that court's policy in the first
amendment area.
68
The specific first amendment rights that may be infringed by Chapter 6
disclosure requirements are the right of free expression, the right to petition
the government, and the judicially implied right of association. 69 It should
be clearly understood that Chapter 6 does not prohibit or restrict the exercise
of these rights and, therefore, is not a direct restraint on first amendment
rights. Rather, Chapter 6 requires an Influencer to disclose his identity and
report certain financial transactions when he has made payments of or over
the $250 amount.70 It is the effect of disclosure upon the exercise of first
amendment rights that raises constitutional questions. Where first amend-
ment freedoms are involved "the Constitution's protection is not limited to
direct interference with fundamental rights.' '71 The United States Supreme
Court has stated that:
[i]n the domain of these indispensible liberties, whether speech
...or association, the decisions of this Court recognize that
abridgement of such rights, even though unintended, may inevi-
tably follow from varied forms of governmental action.
72
While disclosure requirements, such as those in Chapter 6, do not prohibit
expression or association, public disclosure may have an indirect effect on
the exercise of these rights that requires constitutional analysis.
73
65. See U.S. CONsT. amend. I, which in relevant part provides: "Congress shall make no
law. . . abridging the freedom of speech. . . or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."
66. See De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
67. The California Constitution provides:
Every person may freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all
subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this right. A law may not restrain or
abridge liberty of speech or press.
CAL. CONST. art. 1 §2.
The people have the right to instruct their representatives, petition government for
redress of grievances, and assemble freely to consult for the common good.
CAL. CONT. art. 1 §3. The California Supreme Court has said of the state constitution that, "A
protective provision more definitive and inclusive than the First Amendment is contained in our
state constitutional guarantee of the right of free speech and press," Wilson v. Superior Court,
13 Cal. 3d 652, 658, 532 P.2d 116, 120, 119 Cal. Rptr. 468, 472 (1975).
68. For a discussion of the California court's reliance on United States Supreme Court
interpretations of the first amendment, see Comment, Rediscovering the California Declaration
of Rights, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 481, 493-96 (1974). For an opinion that suggests this dependence is
unwarranted, see Diamond v. Bland, II Cal. 3d 331, 336-38, 521 P.2d 460, 464-65, 113 Cal. Rptr.
468, 472-73 (1974) (Mosk, J., dissenting).
69. See, e.g., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 357-60 (1976); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
11 (1976); NAACP v. Alabama ex. rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958); Joint Anti-Facist
Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951); United Public Workers, CIO v. Mitchell, 330
U.S. 75 (947).
70. See text accompanying note 44 supra.
71. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 183 (1972).
72. NAACP v. Alabama ex. rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 461 (1958).
73. The Court noted that strict constitutional scrutiny "is necessary even if any deterrent
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Courts, even when upholding disclosure requirements, have recognized
that compelled disclosure has the effect of chilling or deterring speech.74
This is particularly true when the speaker has aligned himself with groups or
ideas that are currently unacceptable or unpopular in the community; thus
disclosure exposes the speaker to possible harassment and retailiation from
persons in the community opposing such beliefs. It has been noted that
"identification [of the speaker] and fear of reprisal might deter perfectly
peaceful discussion of public matters of importance." 75 The right to free
expression necessarily includes the right of the speaker to remain anony-
mous to permit him to express his unpopular view without fear of reprisal
from the community.7 6 Beyond identification of an individual speaker, it
also has been recognized that public disclosure of an individual's affliation
with an unpopular group, either as a member or contributor, can have the
effect of impairing that individual's right of association. 77 "Inviolability of
privacy in group associations may in many circumstances be indispensible
for preservation of freedoms of association, particularly where a group
expresses dissident beliefs.' '78 Because the first amendment protects not
only political expression but also political association, privacy in association
has been regarded as an important adjunct to associational rights.79 Further,
association has an important function in facilitating advocacy by permitting
the pooling of funds to engage in political expression. 80 Thus, association
effect on the exercise of First Amendment rights arises, not through direct government action,
but indirectly as an unintended but inevitable result of the government's conduct in requiring
disclosure." 424 U.S. at 65. See NAACP v. Alabama ex. rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 461
(1958).
74. See 424 U.S. at 64; Canon v. Justice Court, 61 Cal. 2d 446, 454, 393 P.2d 428,432, 39
Cal. Rptr. 228, 232 (1964). The California Supreme Court, in a later case stated that "[lt bears
emphasis that the disclosure requirement in Canon did abridge freedom of speech [citation],
but under the particular facts, the infringement was minimal and justified by a sufficient state
interest." Huntley v. PUC, 69 Cal. 2d 67, 75, 442 P.2d 685, 690, 69 Cal. Rptr. 605, 610 (1968).
See also Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 90 (1961); Shelton
v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); Beilan v.
Board of Pub. Educ., 357 U.S. 399 (1958); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957);
American Communications Ass'n, CIO v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
75. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 65 (1960). In Talley, the United States Supreme
Court invalidated, on the basis of overbreadth, an ordinance that required all handbills to
identify the writer. The ordinance was intended to prevent fraud, false advertising and libel;
however, because the identification applied to all handbills, the court found that the state's
interest had not been narrowly achieved without unnecessarily inhibiting the exercise of free
expression. Id. at 63-65. But see Clark's dissent in which he denies that there is a right to
anonymous speech. Id. at 70. The decision is regarded as having enumerated a right to
anonymous speech. Huntley v. PUC, 69 Cal. 2d 67, 73,442 P.2d 685,689, 69 Cal. Rptr. 605, 609
(1968); Eisen v. Regents of the University of California, 269 Cal. App. 2d 696, 701, 75 Cal. Rptr.
45, 49 (1969). For a general discussion of the right to anonymity, see Comment, The Constitu-
tional Right to Anonymity: Free Speech, Disclosure and the Devil, 70 YALE. L.J. 1084 (1961).
76. See, e.g., Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 533 P.2d 222, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94
(1975); Huntley v. PUC, 69 Cal. 2d 67, 442 P.2d 685, 69 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1968).
77. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
78. Id. at 462.
79. See id.
80. The United States Supreme Court has noted that "virtually every means of com-
municating ideas in today's mass society requires the expenditure of money." Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976). Further, an association's right to join together "is diluted if it does
not include the right to pool money through contributions, for funds are often essential if
'advocacy' is to be truly or optimally 'effective'." Id. at 65-66.
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and privacy of association are protected to enable individuals to effectively
engage in political speech.8"
These rights, expression, petition, association and their supporting
"rights" of anonymity and associational privacy, are not absolute;82 the
state may demonstrate an interest sufficiently great to permit abridgment of
these rights.83 Chapter 6 must be carefully analyzed to determine whether
the potential chilling effect of its disclosure requirements will withstand
constitutional challenge.84 This necessarily requires a discussion of the
proper constitutional test to apply to these disclosure regulations.
A. Spending Money to Communicate: Speech or Conduct
A regulation of speech requires strict constitutional scrutiny.8 5 When
speech and conduct are combined, however, a state regulation that concerns
the conduct alone is subject to a less rigorous test. In United States v.
O'Brien,86 the United States Supreme Court held that where both speech
and conduct are present, the state can permissibly regulate the conduct
element, although it incidently affects the speech element, if the regulation
serves an important state interest that is unrelated to the suppression of
speech. 87 In order to apply the proper constitutional test to the disclosure
regulations of Chapter 6, it is necessary to determine whether expenditures
of money for communication purposes contain sufficient elements of con-
duct to warrant use of the less strict O'Brien test.
To apply the O'Brien test to Chapter 6, spending money to influence
legislative or administrative action must be characterized as both speech and
conduct. The Influencer, by spending money to influence, either directly or
in the form of a contribution to an association, has communicated his beliefs
to others. The spending of money to influence legislative action is an
exercise of the rights to political speech, petition and association. Spending
money, however, is also conduct insofar as it is a physical act that does not
in all cases involve a communication. 88 The United States Supreme Court
81. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 65-66 (1976).
82. American Communications Ass'n, CIO v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 399 (1950).
83. 424 U.S. at 44-45.
84. The fact that Chapter 6 was passed as an initiative measure does not affect the
application of the constitutional analysis. In reference to this issue, the California Supreme
Court has stated:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the
vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities
and officials and to establish them as legal principals to be applied by the courts.
One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of
worship and assembly and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote;
they depend on the outcome of no elections.
Weaver v. Jordan, 64 Cal. 2d 235, 241, 411 P.2d 289, 293-94, 49 Cal. Rptr. 537, 541-42 (1966),
quoting West Virginia St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
85. See, e.g., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 362 (1976); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64
(1976).
86. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
87. Id. at 376-77, 382; 424 U.S. at 16.
88. For example, an expenditure made to purchase a commodity or service does not
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addressed this question in Buckley v. Valeo,8 9 stating that:
[T]his Court has never suggested that the dependence of a com-
munication on the expenditure of money operates itself to in-
troduce a non-speech element or reduce the exacting scrutiny
required by the First Amendment. 90
The Court went on to describe the physical act of spending money as a
"neutral element" in a communication and not a separate conduct element
that could be regulated by the state.91 Since an expenditure made for the
purpose of communication did not contain a sufficient conduct element that
could be regulated, O'Brien did not apply.
The above reasoning would appear to be equally applicable to the disclo-
sure requirements in Chapter 6. Chapter 6 requires disclosure of expendi-
tures that are made for the purpose of communicating with a legislative or an
administrative official, or the public. Since the act of spending money for
communication is a "neutral element," not conduct, the less demanding
O'Brien test is inappropriate to a constitutional anaysis of Chapter 6 disclo-
sure requirements. Rather, Chapter 6 disclosure requirements must be sub-
jected to strict constitutional scrutiny.
Assuming, however, that an expenditure to communicate can be charac-
terized as speech plus conduct to permit the application of O'Brien, that test
would still not be satisfied since the regulation of conduct is not unrelated to
the suppression of speech. 92 The disclosure requirements contained in Chap-
ter 6 are based on a determination that the communication involved may
have a harmful effect upon legislative decisions. 93 Thus the state's interest is
directly related to the communication itself. Since speech is being regulated,
the O'Brien test is not satisfied and strict scrutiny of Chapter 6 disclosure
requirements is necessary.
B. Indirect Infringement of First Amendment Rights
As discussed previously, Chapter 6 of the Political Reform Act, by
requiring disclosure when an Influencer exercises first amendment rights,
has the effect of chilling or deterring speech and must therefore be subjected
to constitutional scrutiny. 94 A balancing test is applied to determine whether
usually involve communication. Communication, however, is involved when an expenditure is
made to send a telegram or to place an ad in a newspaper. See 424 U.S. at 17.
89. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). For a contrary analysis, see Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is
Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001 (1976).
90. 424 U.S. at 16-17, 65 n.76.
91. Id. at 16, 65 n.76. The Court stated that "O'Brien is inapposite, for money is a neutral
element not always associated with speech but a necessary and integral part of many, perhaps
most, forms of communication." Id. at 65 n.76.
92. See text accompanying note 87 supra. See also Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 363-64
n.17 (1976); 424 U.S. at 17, 65 n.76.
93. Implicit in the state's desire to expose and eliminate improper influences directed at
legislative decisions, is the assumption that some forms of communication may be harmful. See
text accompanying note 109 infra. Cf. 424 U.S. at 17, 65 n.76.
94. See text accompanying notes at 75-81 supra.
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a state regulation may stand in light of the regulation's indirect infringement
of first amendment rights. 95 This test is used to determine whether the state's
interest is compelling96 or sufficiently substantial97 to subordinate individual
rights. One constitutional scholar has described the test as follows:
The formula is that the court must, in each case, balance the
individual and social interest in freedom of expression against the
social interest sought by the regulation which restricts
expression.
98
If the state's interest after this weighing process is found to be greater than
the burden imposed on individual rights, the Court has required that the
regulation bear a "relevant correlation" 99 or a "substantial relation" 100 to
that interest. In other words, the regulation must bear more than a "rational
relationship" to the interest furthered.10 Finally, the state must achieve its
purpose by the least drastic means. 102 This last requirement insures that the
means used to achieve a legitimate state interest will not intrude upon the
exercise of fundamental liberties to a greater extent than is necessary.1
0 3 If
the state regulation has application that extends beyond that interest or has
the effect of unnecessarily deterring permissible activity, the entire regula-
tion will be void due to overbreadth.104
95. See, e.g., 424 U.S. at 68; Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 50-51 (1961); Talley v.
California, 362 U.S. 60, 66 (1960)(Harlan, J., concurring); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S.
516, 524 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama ex. rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 463-64 (1960); American
Communications Ass'n, CIO v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 399 (1950); White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d
757, 771-72 n.7, 533 P.2d 222, 232 n. 7, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94, 104 n.7 (1975); City of Carmel-by-the-
Sea v. Young, 2 Cal. 3d 259, 269, 466 P.2d 225, 232, 85 Cal. Rptr. 1, 8 (1970). But see United
States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 268 n.20 (1967).
For a discussion of balancing, see generally Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom
of Expression, 74 YALE L.J. 1, 7-14 (1974); Kalven, Upon Rereading Mr. Justice Black on the
First Amendment, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 428,442-44 (1967); Robison, Protection of Associations
from Compulsory Disclosure of Membership, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 614, 623-24 (1958).
96. NAACP v. Alabama ex. rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449,463 (1960). The compelling state
interest test was explained by the Court as follows:
In every case, therefore, where legislative abridgement of the rights is asserted, the
courts should be astute to examine the effect of the challenged legislation. Mere
legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience may well
support regulation directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient to justify
such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic
institutions. And so, as cases arise, the delicate and difficult task falls upon the courts
to weigh the circumstances and to appraise the substantiality of the reasons advanced
in support of the regulation of the free enjoyment of the rights.
Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939).
97. See Gibson v. Florida Legis. Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 545 (1963).
98. Emerson, Towards a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 912
(1963)(emphasis added).
99. Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 525 (1960).
100. Gibson v. Florida Legis. Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 546 (1963).
101. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
102. See, e.g., Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17,24 (1968); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S.
258, 268 (1967); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479,
488 (1960).
103. Less drastic means has been explained by the Court to mean that "[if the State has
open to it a less drastic way of satisfying its legitimate interests, it may not choose a legislative
scheme that broadly stifles the exercise of fundamental personal liberties." Kusper v. Pontikes,
414 U.S. 51, 59 (1973). See also Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 363 (1976); Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 20 (1976).
104. The Court has said that there is a
pervasive threat inherent in [the] very existence [of a statute] which does not aim
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To date, neither the United States nor California Supreme Courts has had
the occasion to apply compelling state interest and overbreadth analysis to
disclosure regulations specifically concerning legislative advocacy.
10 5
Therefore, this analysis will be applied to the disclosure requirements
imposed on the Influencer by Chapter 6. The interest of the state will be
balanced against the burden on individual rights to determine if the state has
a compelling interest in the disclosure regulations and, further, whether
those regulations achieve the state's purpose by the least drastic means.
Essential to this analysis, however, is a clear delineation between the state's
interest in regulating the Influencer and the infringement on the Influencer's
individual rights.
1. The State's Interest in Regulating Lobbying Activities
The state clearly has an interest in maintaining the purity10 6 of its govern-
mental functions. 10 7 By passing the Political Reform Act of 1974, the people
of California expressed their desire to have stricter controls and additional
disclosure requirements placed on lobbying activities to inhibit and uncover
specifically at evils within the allowable area of state control but. . . sweeps within
its ambit other activities that in ordinary circumstances constitute an exercise of
freedom of speech.
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940).
For an analysis of the development of the constitutional doctrine of overbreadth, see Note,
The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844 (1970); Note, Less Drastic
Means and the First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 464 (1969).
105. See generally United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954); United States v. Rumely,
345 U.S. 41 (1953). The California Supreme Court has stated that a statute requiring every
person who writes, prints, or distributes literature designed to defeat or injure a candidate to
include in such literature his name and address, does not unconstitutionally interfere with the
freedom of speech. Canon v. Justice Court, 61 Cal. 2d 446, 459-60, 393 P.2d 428, 436, 39 Cal.
Rptr. 228, 236 (1964). The court, however, found the statute to be unconstitutionally dis-
criminatory. The purpose of the statute was to "deter scurrilous hit and run smear attacks...
in the course of political campaigns." Id. at 453, 393 P.2d at 432, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 232. To this
end, the court found the statute to be proper on first amendment grounds because it "impinges
upon full freedom of expression only during a limited period of time," the period preceding
elections, and because "the [statute] only applies to attacks on candidates, not to writings
which are a communication of views about issues. " Id. at 452, 393 P.2d at 431, 39 Cal. Rptr. at
231 (emphasis added). In a later disclosure case, the court emphasized that the disclosure
requirement upheld in Canon was limited to a specific type of communication, and then, for
only a specified time. Huntley v. PUC, 69 Cal. 2d 67, 75, 442 P.2d 685, 690, 69 Cal. Rptr. 605,
610 (1968). The disclosure required by Chapter 6 is not limited to a certain period of time nor is
it limited to only expenditures and activities that may improperly influence legislative action.
Rather, Chapter 6 contains an expansive disclosure requirement that applies to all situations
where expenditures of at least $250 are made to influence legislative action. See text accom-
panying notes 43-63 supra. Therefore, the balance struck by the court in Canon does not
foreclose analysis of the disclosure requirements found in Chapter 6.
106. "Purity" is a term used by Professor Emerson in discussing laws intended to protect
government from corrupting influences. See Emerson, Towards a General Theory of the First
Amendment, 72 YALE. L.J. 877 (1963).
107. See Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934). The Court, in upholding the
constitutionality of the Corrupt Practices Act stated:
Congress, undoubtedly, possesses that power [to protect the political process], as it
possesses every other power essential to preserve the departments and institutions of
the general government from impairment or destruction, whether threatened by force
or corruption.
Id. at 545. See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548
(1973); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968); United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 70
(1949).
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improper influences directed at the legislative process. °8 Improper influ-
ences may take two general forms. First, expenditures may be made to
distort the legislator's impression of public support for or opposition to a
legislative proposal. The ballot pamphlet statement presented to the voters
emphasized that the Act was specifically concerned with identifying well-
financed lobbying efforts backed by special interests that distort the people's
representation in legislative decisions.10 9 A well-financed special interest,
actively advocating its position, may give legislators the impression that
there is widespread support for, or opposition to, a particular measure when
in fact actual public support or opposition is quite small. Second, expendi-
tures may be made to curry the favor of a legislative official. This may take
the form of gifts or payments made to benefit a legislator or as part of a
financial relationship with a legislator. All of these expenditures may have
the effect of making a legislator more responsive to the interests of the
person making the expenditure. The influence exerted therefore would
extend beyond consideration of the merits of the position advocated. Thus,
the intended thrust of Chapter 6 is at the exposure of those who use money to
improperly influence legislative action. 110 To facilitate exposure, Chapter 6
requires disclosure of various expenditures and financial relationships that
may have an improper influence on legislative decisions.
Disclosure promotes the state interest of exposing and inhibiting improper
108. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §81001 (c), (e), (f) (legislative findings) which states:
(c) Costs of conducting election campaigns have increased greatly in recent years,
and candidates have been forced to finance their campaigns by seeking large con-
tributions from lobbyists and organizations who thereby gain disproportionate influ-
ence over governmental decisions;
(e) Lobbyists often make their contributions to incumbents who cannot be effec-
tively challenged because of election laws and abusive practices which give the
incumbent an unfair advantage;
(f) The wealthy individuals and organizations which make large campaign contribu-
tions frequently extend their influence by employing lobbyists and spending large
amounts to influence legislative and administrative actions ....
See CAL. GOV'T CODE §81002(c)(legislative intent) which states:
(c) The activities of lobbyists should be regulated and their finances disclosed in
order that improper influences will not be directed at public officials ....
109. Koupal, Spohn & Walsh, Arguments in Favor of Proposition 9, CALIF. SEC. OF STATE,
CALIFORNIA VOTERS PAMPHLET PRIMARY ELECTION JUNE 4, 1974 at 36. The problem to be solved
by the Political Reform Act was characterized as follows:
Big money unduly influences politics: big money from wealthy individuals and
wealthy organizations. In politics, these powerful interests-whatever their party-
usually have one goal: special favors from government. In California, corporations
receive large tax breaks from the state. Companies contracting with local government
often contribute to the campaigns of local officials. From city councils to the state
legislature, oil companies, land developers, and other powerful interests sit down
with our elected officials to write new laws. And the cost of state and local govern-
ment continues to climb.
Id. Part of the solution, referring to lobbyist regulations, was to "[plrohibit lobbyists from
giving campaign contributions and expensive gifts to politicians." Id.
As to the propriety of using the ballot pamphlet statement to construe an initiative measure,
see White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 775 n. 11, 533 P.2d 222, 234 n. 1I, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94, 106 n. 11
(1975).
110. The FPPC has stated that:
[P]rovisions of the Political Reform Act are premised on the idea that a lobbyist is an
advocate and that persons who lobby should succeed or fail on the merits of the
position and the persuasiveness of the arguments.
I F.P.P.C. Ops. 86, 87 (No. 75-098, July 3, 1975).
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influences directed at the legislative function in two important ways. First,
the disclosure required by Chapter 6 informs the public of who is spending
money to enlist the support of legislative officials.111 Presumably, such
disclosure will provide the public with the knowledge necessary to deter-
mine the quality of representation that they receive and will enable in-
terested citizens to demonstrate their opposition to or support for particular
legislative proposals. Second, disclosure identifies to the legislators the
sources of those pressures intended to influence their decisions. This interest
was recognized by the court in United States v. Harriss12 when it stated:
Full realization of the American ideal of government by elected
representatives depends in no small extent on their ability to
properly evaluate such pressures. Otherwise the voice of the
people may all too easily be drowned out by the voice of special
interest groups seeking favored treatment while masquerading as
proponents of the public weal.
113
It would seem fair to characterize the state's interests served by the
disclosure requirements as the exposure and prevention of improper influ-
ence upon legislative functions by the use of money. 14 Disclosure identifies
111. The FPPC has also stated:
One purpose of disclosure by lobbyists and their employers, as well as by others who
spend large sums to influence legislative or administrative action, is to inform the
public of the resources being spent to influence government.
I F.P.P.C. Ops. 1, 8 (No. 75-044, Feb. 21, 1975).
112. 347 U.S. 612 (1954).
113. Id. at 625. Well-financed special interest groups are able to inundate the legislature
with misinformation by direct communication, publicity campaigns, or utilizing the third-party
technique. In this latter activity, a special interest group will use other groups or individuals to
communicate with the legislature or publicize the interest group's message to create the
appearance that there is wide spread support for the interest group's position. Eastern R.R.
Pres. Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 140 (1961).
114. This statement is not intended to characterize the use of money as improper in all
cases. Rather, it is specifically intended to include those situations where money is used for
purposes beyond the communication of ideas alone.
The United States Supreme Court, in dealing with restrictions and disclosure requirements
applicable to contributions and expenditures for election campaigns, recognized a state interest
in preventing the appearance of corruption. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27, 67 (1976).
This state interest was also asserted by the FPPC to prohibit lobbyists from arranging contribu-
tions. See Appellant's Opening Brief at 29-30, Institute of Gov't Advocates v. Younger, No.
48818 (Ct. App., 2d App. Dist., filed Aug. 16, 1976). Arguably this state interest is inapplicable
when asserted against the Influencer since disclosure may in fact restrict his right to assert
political beliefs. Cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27 n.29 (1976). If, however, this interest was
applicable to the Influencer, the same analysis discussed in reference to the state's interests
would be used. See text accompanying notes 95-104 supra.
The FPPC has noted that money can be used for purposes, beyond communication, of
improperly influencing government by offering inducements or pressuring officials. The Com-
mission noted that:
The acquisition of adequate information is essential to sound legislative and adminis-
trative action. It is not the purpose of the Political Reform Act to interfere in any way
in the free flow of information to officials. Only financial pressures and inducements
are sought to be limited and disclosed. See Section 81001(b).
I F.P.P.C. OPs. 16, 18 (No. 75-026, May 1, 1975) (emphasis added).
CAL. GOV'T CODE §81001(b) provides:
Public officials, whether elected or appointed, should perform their duties in an
impartial manner, free from bias caused by their own financial interests or the
financial interests of persons who have supported them . . ..
The FPPC, in comments to its regulations, has differentiated between uses of money that
have the potential for creating undue or improper influences, and uses where this evil is not
present. The FPPC limited the duties of the Influencer, employer and lobbyist under Chapter 6
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the source of influencing efforts, providing legislators with the information
needed to properly represent their constituency's interests. In addition,
disclosure informs the public of the influences being leveled at their repre-
sentatives. This information then permits the public to indicate their dissatis-
faction with their representatives either by direct communication to the
representative or at the polls by electing another representative. The state's
interests in disclosure, however, must be balanced against the inhibitory
effect that disclosure may have upon the exercise of first amendment rights.
Thus, it will be necessary to determine what rights are affected by the
disclosure regulations of Chapter 6.
2. Individual Rights and Social Interests Affected by Chapter 6 Disclosure
Requirements
The regulations in Chapter 6 are applicable when an Influencer makes
expenditures in the attempt to influence legislative or administrative action
by advocating his position either individually or by associating with
others. 115 Further, Chapter 6 applies to advocacy directed at either the
legislative official or the public. Three first amendment rights are involved
in these activities, those of expression, petition and association. Of the
three, petition has received the least judicial explication. The right to
petition the government, however, lies at the very heart of a representative
government. 116 Direct contact with the legislator to make one's views
known is clearly an exercise of the right to petition. 117 An individual who is
interested in proposed environmental legislation, for example, is petitioning
the government when he writes, calls, or speaks directly with legislators
voting on the proposal. In addition, a publicity campaign designed to
generate public support for a particular position involves the exercise of the
by excluding from regulation any such duties (e.g., reporting) that would otherwise extend to
any agency official whose agency the particular person has not attempted to influence.
The purpose of the prohibitions and disclosure requirements as applied to agency
officials is to assure that no undue economic influences will be brought to bear on
such officials when they undertake administrative actions.
Comment to 2 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §18600 (emphasis added).
The FPPC has excluded from regulation by Chapter 6 certain otherwise reportable transac-
tions between an Influencer, lobbyist or employer, and a state official:
Certain types of routine transactions, however, in which a business sells goods or
services at a standard price and on standard terms to the general public, are not
susceptible to being used for special influence purposes. Reporting of such transac-
tions would not further any purposes of the Act ....
Comment to 2 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §18650.
115. See text accompanying notes 43-63 supra.
116. The United States Supreme Court has noted that:
The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its
citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition
for a redress of grievances.
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1876). The right to petition, however, includes
more than merely the redress of grievances. An individual seeking a personal benefit from the
government is also exercising the right to petition. See Rice, The Constitutional Right of
Association, 16 HASTINGs L.J. 491, 500-03 (1965).
117. See Eastern R.R. Pres. Conf. v. Noerr Motor Frieght, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 138-39
(1961).
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right to petition. 118 Thus, the individual in the above example may direct his
influencing efforts at the public by informing them of the proposed legisla-
tion, encouraging their support and enlisting their efforts to make such
support known to the legislative body concerned.
Certainly the right to petition government is not an inferior right, and it
has been characterized as one of the "cognate" rights of the first amend-
ment, different in scope yet inseparable from the rest. 119 The California
courts have recognized the importance of access to elected officials, noting
that "[c]rucial though voting is as a method of participation in representa-
tive government, access to elected officials is also an important means of
democratic expression-and one that is not limited to those who cast
ballots." 120 Legislative and judicial caution has been traditionally exercised
with respect to the regulation of political activities and citizen's access to
legislative officials. 12' Although petition has not been a highly visible right
in constitutional discussion, the petition right serves to keep elected repre-
sentatives in touch with the people and deserves to be rigorously
protected. 1
22
The importance of free expression to the democratic process has been
consistently expressed by the courts123 and commentators.124 The United
118. Id. at 140-41.
119. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945).
120. See Calderon v. City of Los Angeles, 4 Cal. 3d 251, 259, 481 P.2d 489, 494, 93 Cal.
Rptr. 361, 366 (1971)(citations omitted). The opinion went on to note:
One form of such access is embodied in the First Amendment's guarantee of "the
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances." There is nothing in that amendment to limit its protection to
registered voters.
Id. at n.8.
121. The United States Supreme Court has stated:
Congress has traditionally exercised extreme caution in legislating with respect to
problems relating to the conduct of political activities, a caution which has been
reflected in the decisions of this Court interpreting such legislation.
Eastern R.R. Pres. Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 141 (1961).
122. The United States Supreme Court has stated:
In a representative democracy such as this, [the legislative and executive] branches
of government act on behalf of the people and, to a very large extent, the whole
concept of representation depends upon the ability of the people to make their wishes
known to their representatives.
Id. at 137.
The California Supreme Court has characterized the right to petition as follows:
The petition for redress of grievances epitomizes the use of freedom of expression to
keep elected officials responsive to the electorate, thereby forestalling the violence
which may be practiced by desperate and disillusioned citizens. This is undoubtedly
why it receives explicit First Amendment protection in addition to the protection
afforded to freedom of expression generally.
Los Angeles Teachers Union Local 1021 v. Los Angeles Bd. of Educ., 71 Cal. 2d 551,559,455
P.2d 827, 832, 78 Cal. Rptr. 723, 728 (1969).
123. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976), quoting Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476, 484 (1957) where the Court, referring to political expression and the election process,
specifically stated:
The First Amendment affords the broadest protection to such political expression in
order "to assure [the] unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of
political and social changes desired by the people."
124. See, e.g., Emerson, Towards a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J.
877 (1963).
The crucial point, however, is not that freedom of expression is politically useful, but
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States Supreme Court has stated that "debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide open. . . . " 5 Free expression serves two
distinct interests in a democratic government. First, the speaker has the right
to actively participate in self-government and express his personal de-
sires. 126 Second, democratic government depends upon the wealth of ideas
generated by free expression to guide and develop governmental policy. 1
27
Thus, the speaker's right to add his ideas to the market place benefits those
who receive and use the ideas generated. 128 The public then has a right to be
informed about political matters by an adequate flow of information. The
expression of ideas is not limited merely to academic discourse; the right to
expression includes the right to vigorously advocate personal interests to the
public and legislative officials.
129
Since there is an interest in having wide dissemination of diverse view-
points, 130 it is often necessary to protect persons from public and private
retaliation for expressing or aligning themselves with groups promoting
unpopular or minority viewpoints.131 The expression of unpopular or minor-
that it is indispensable to the operation of a democratic form of government. . . .[I]t
follows that the governed must, in order to exercise their right of consent, have full
freedom of expression both in forming individual judgments and in forming the
common judgment.
Id. at 883.
125. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
126. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214
(1966).
127. E.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-63 (1971); Red Lion Broadcasting Co.
v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389-90 (1969).
In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 71 (1976), the Court noted:
The public interest also suffers [when disclosure deters the exercise of first amend-
ment rights] if that result comes to pass, for there is a consequent reduction in the
free circulation of ideas both within and without the political arena.
128. In Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966), the Court observed:
Whatever differences may exist about interpretations of the First Amendment, there
is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was to
protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.
129. The United States Supreme Court has stated that "it is a prized American privilege to
speak one's mind ...on all public institutions." Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270
(1941). Further, "abstract discussion is not the only species of communication which the
Constitution protects; the First Amendment also protects vigorous advocacy, certainly of
lawful ends, against governmental intrusion." NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,429 (1963). See
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48 (1976).
130. The United States Supreme Court has said that:
The vitality of civil and political institutions in our society depends on free discus-
sion. . . . [I]t is only through free debate and free exchange of ideas that govern-
ment remains responsive to the will of the people and peaceful change is effected.
The right to speak freely and to promote diversity of ideas and programs is therefore
one of the chief distinctions that set us apart from totalitarian regimes.
Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949). The Court further noted that the failure to protect
free speech "would lead to standardization of ideas either by legislatures, courts, or dominant
political or community groups." Id. at 4-5.
The California Supreme Court has noted that:
(T]he freedoms of speech and press protected by the First Amendment rest on "the
assumption that the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and
antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public ...."
Weaver v. Jordan, 64 Cal. 2d 235, 245, 411 P.2d 289, 296, 49 Cal. Rptr. 537, 544 (1966), quoting
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
131. The California Supreme Court has stated that "[it must be remembered that the right
of freedom of speech is primarily intended to protect minority views." Huntley v. PUC, 69 Cal.
2d 67, 73, 442 P.2d 685, 688-89, 69 Cal. Rptr. 605, 608-09 (1968).
The importance of anonymity, whether in one's associations or individually, is greatest when
minority or unpopular views are being expressed.
960
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ity views is an important contribution to the public forum. Beyond the fact
that, in time, minority views often gain popular acceptance, it is important
in a democratic society that the various elements be allowed to freely
advocate their interests. In the legislative sphere, issues often cut across
political, philosphical and community lines. Thus, the type of expression
that becomes an "unpopular" view may itself be rather innocuous to the
majority of people. Within the small circle of an individual's contacts,
however, the expression of such views may result in retaliation from
employers, community and social groups. 132 Thus, the effect of chilling
speech may have broader implications than only restricting views that are
normally considered unpopular. In fact, the expression of ideas from per-
sons in the mainstream of society may also be deterred. Examples include
the environmentalist working to oppose the construction of a dam that is
favored by his employer, or a person holding a pro-abortion view who is
active in religious organizations opposing abortion. These views, while not
unpopular in the majoritarian sense, may be unpopular in the smaller sphere
of an individual's relationship with his community.
Finally, there is an interest in associating for the purposes of advocacy. 
133
Group association is a protected right because it enhances "effective advo-
cacy." 134 This right to association also allows for the pooling of money to
advocate beliefs. The right to form together "for the advancement of beliefs
and ideas" is diluted if it does not include the right to pool money through
contributions, for money is often essential if advocacy is to be optimally
effective. 135 Further, the public interest suffers if organizations are unable to
effectively express their views, thus reducing the amount of information in
the market place of ideas. 136 This would indicate that association includes
more than the creation of a permanent group, but contemplates the forma-
tion of ad hoc associations around issues as well. 137 This has the salutory
result of increasing the circulation of ideas in the political forum.
Registration of persons engaged in a popular cause imposes no hardship while...
registration of names of persons who resist popular will would lead not only to
expressions of ill will and hostility but to the loss of members by the [unpopular]
Association.
NAACP v. Patty, 159 F. Supp. 503, 526 (E.D. Va. 1958). Echoing this view, one scholar has
criticized the argument that disclosure is proper if it has a repressive effect on undesirable
activities by pointing out that this ignores the simple fact that "exposure operates dis-
criminatorily against unpopular groups." Robison, Protection of Associations from Compulsory
Disclosure of Membership, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 614, 639 (1958).
132. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 486-87
(1960); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 521-22 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462-63 (1960).
133. See 424 U.S. at 65.
134. The right to association has been recognized by the United States Supreme Court as a
basic constitutional freedom. Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 57 (1973). Further the Court has
noted that the right to association is "closely allied to freedom of speech and a right which, like
free speech, lies at the foundation of a free society." Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 486
(1968). See also NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1960).
135. See 424 U.S. at 65-66.
136. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
137. Groups or associations are often formed by individuals to promote their common
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Within the governmental process, the expression of ideas serves an
interest beyond that of the speaker alone. The protections afforded free
expression, the right to petition and the right of association allow for the
formulation of the ideas that will affect governmental decisions. If govern-
mental policy is to serve the interests of the people, it is necessary to
minimize the restrictions that can have an inhibitory effect upon these rights.
Since the state's interest in the disclosure regulations of Chapter 6 and the
first amendment rights affected by such regulation have been delineated, the
required disclosure of influencing activities by Influencers can be subjected
to the constitutional analysis previously developed. Thus, the state's inter-
ests in disclosure will be balanced against the burdens that disclosure
imposes on the first amendment rights of petition, expression and
association.
APPLICATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL TESTS TO THE INFLUENCER
DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS
Regulation of lobbying activities can clearly serve the legitimate state
interest of preventing abuses of the legislative process. Such abuses occur
when expenditures do not merely communicate ideas, but have the effect of
distorting legislative perceptions of public opinion or give the spender an
undue influence in the formation of legislative decisions. 138 The individual
first amendment rights affected by a disclosure regulation, however, must
be protected since such disclosure may prevent the expression of legitimate
ideas and individual desires which should be heard by the public and
considered by the state legislative bodies. Disclosure can have the further
inhibitory effect of discouraging membership in and contributions to associ-
ations that advocate unpopular or minority views.
The constitutional analysis applicable to a regulation that has the indirect
effect of infringing first amendment rights will be applied to the Influencer
regulations in Chapter 6. Because disclosure has the effect of indirectly
infringing rights of speech and association, the state must show that a
compelling interest is served by such regulation. In order to apply the
compelling state interest test, a division between the various types of
Influencers has been made. First, the constitutional test will be applied to
interests in the passage or defeat of a specific legislative proposal. The right to associate
promotes individual and public interests by permitting such groups to pool funds and otherwise
function as a unit to publicly express their interests and beliefs.
138. The communication and advocacy of individual interests and beliefs to affect legisla-
tive action involves the concept of influence. The regulation of influence alone is not the
purpose of the Act. The Act seeks to prevent improper influence from affecting legislative
decisions. Thus, improper influence is not communication alone, but the attempt to affect
legislative decisions by means that extend beyond communicating an individual's ideas and
arguing personal interests. Improper influence comprehends the idea that the legislative deci-
sion has been affected by something more than the merits of the position advocated, For
example, if a legislator has received a gift or benefit from one influencing legislative action,
there is a very real possibility that the legislator will consider more than the merits of the
position alone in making his decision to support the Influencer's interest.
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the regulation requiring an individual Influencer to disclose his expenditures
to engage in direct influencing efforts. Second, discussion will focus on the
regulation of the individual Influencer's indirect influencing efforts. Finally,
the test will be applied to the regulations requiring the disclosure of direct
and indirect influencing expenditures insofar as individual members are
required to disclose their own membership in the association or have their
membership disclosed by the association.
A. Individual Influencing: Direct Communication
The Influencer is subject to the disclosure requirements of Chapter 6 if he
spends $250 or more in one month to influence legislative action by means
of direct communication with a legislative official. 139 For example, direct
communication may take the form of personal contact, letters, telegrams,
telephone conversations or similar means of communicating the Influencer's
message directly to the legislative official. 140 In most cases, expenditures
are necessary if the Influencer is to make use of these types of communica-
tion. Payments involved in connection with these direct communications are
also included in the $250 figure. 41 These would specifically include pay-
ments made to research, compile and organize data for use in direct com-
munication. The expenditures made to effectively communicate, when
aggregated, may easily surpass the $250 threshold amount, thus requiring
the individual to report as an Influencer.
The types of expenses listed above are all expenses that may be incurred if
the Influencer is to communicate effectively. If the individual Influencer is
using personal funds to influence, and those funds are used for only pur-
poses of direct communication with a state official, the possibility that such
139. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§86108(h), 82045(d).
140. The fact that direct contact necessarily involves minimal disclosure of identity does
not mean that broad disclosure via a public record required by the government is permissible.
See White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 768 n.4, 533 P.2d 222, 229 n.4, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94, 101 n.4
(1975).
141. CAL. GOV'T CODE §82045(d). 2 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §18621 (3) and (5) require an
Influencer to disclose:
(3) The gross compensation paid or payable to employees for that portion of their
time devoted to direct communication with elective state officials, legislative officials
or agency officials if any part of the purpose of the communication is to influence
legislative or administrative action. For the purposes of this paragraph, time spent in
diredt communication includes only the time of the persons actually communicating
and the time of any employees engaged in developing the material upon which the
communication is based or which is transmitted. However, no wages of any emp-
loyee who spends less than 10% of compensated time during any one month in
communicating or developing material used in communicating directly need be allo-
cated or reported.
(5) Any payment or portion thereof not described in paragraphs 1, 2, 3 or 4 which
would not have been incurred but for the direct communication, or the soliciting or
urging others to communicate directly with any elective state official, legislative
official or agency official for the purpose of influencing legislative or administrative
action.
It had been proposed that travel expenses be excluded from computation of the $250
threshold amount for Influencers. See STATE OF CALIFORNIA, FAIR POLITICAL PRACTICES CoM-
mission, Proposed Regulation Amendment, Draft No. 1, for 2 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §18621. This
regulation was not adopted by the FPPC.
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expenditure will have the effect of improperly influencing the legislative
process is small. 14 2 The money itself has been used only to present the
Influencer's position with supporting data and has not been used to curry the
legislator's favor by the means of gifts or other direct financial benefit. 143 In
addition, the legislator knows who the Influencer is since there is direct
contact; thus there is little chance that a legislator's perceptions will be
distorted since he can properly evaluate the source of the influencing
effort. 144
The expenditure, when made for purposes of communication alone, does
not extend the influence exerted beyond the merits of the Influencer's
position or ability to effectively present his argument. 45 The consideration
given to the Influencer's grievance or position is based on effective personal
advocacy. This type of advocacy-personal appeals made to a state of-
ficial-has not been traditionally considered a lobbying activity. 146 Thus,
Chapter 6 has gone beyond regulating the type of lobbying activity that may
contain the evils of undue influence by extending the regulation to activities
where mere influence is present. 47 The state's interest in the disclosure of
such activity is small, while the burden placed on individual rights is great.
Since there is no compelling interest served by such disclosure, the regula-
tion is overbroad because the regulation is not limited to activities where the
state has such an interest in disclosure.
It would seem the public's need to know who is contacting the legislator
in this case is not of the same magnitude as when the Influencer has
otherwise used money to benefit or unduly influence the legislator. Al-
though disclosure of all contacts with the legislator may enable the public to
know more fully who has influenced the legislator's decision, it has never
been argued that all such disclosure is vital or constitutionally permis-
sible. 148 When an individual Influencer engages in direct communication
with a legislative official to redress a grievance or seek a benefit, he is
exercising the right to petition in its most basic form. Although rights of
142. See text accompanying notes 106-114 supra.
143. A different situation is present when expenditures are made both for communication
and for other influencing purposes such as to benefit a legislative official. In this case, the
aggregation of all expenditures to determine if the reporting amount has been reached would be
required. This would be necessary since it would be impossible to accurately determine what
expenditures may have the effect of improperly influencing legislative action.
144. When a legislator is confronted by the Influencer in person, there is no question of
who is behind the influencing effort. If a lobbyist, for example, did not disclose his employer,
the legislator would be unable to determine whose interests were actually being represented.
145. Chapter 6 does not attempt to identify the influencing efforts of wealthy persons in
particular, but rather the expenditure of money by any person when such expenditure may
improperly influence legislative action. Even if Chapter 6 had the purpose of identifying the
influencing activities of wealthy individuals, such purpose would probably be impermissible. In
this regard, the Court has noted that "the concept that government may restrict the speech of
some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign
to the First Amendment. ... Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976).
146. See text accompanying notes 25-29 supra.
147. See note 138 supra.
148. See note 140 supra.
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expression are also involved since the Influencer is engaged in political
speech, the primary right being exercised is the right to petition. Disclosure
requirements have the effect of chilling an individual's exercise of the right
to petition the government for various reasons. 14 9 The primary reason is the
fear that public identification will result in retaliation by those who disagree
with the viewpoint expressed. The effect on the legislative process is to
reduce the inventory of ideas and proposals that can be considered by
legislators in developing legislative policy. To unnecessarily encumber the
individual right to petition the government creates an anomalous result. First
amendment rights are intended to facilitate expression of the ideas and
interests necessary to a representative government. If representative govern-
ment is to truly reflect the needs and desires of the public, the, representa-
tives must be informed of those needs and desires. Yet, to protect that
government by requiring broad disclosure deters the very expression that
lies at the heart of a representative government. Thus, the individual first
amendment rights are extremely important to maintain a representative form
of government. To require disclosure of these activities is to prevent certain
members of society from exercising the rights of petition and expression.
Therefore, a great burden has been imposed by Chapter 6 on the individual
Influencer's exercise of these first amendment rights.
The rights of the individual to petition the government and freely express
his political views, when balanced against the state's interest in disclosure,
are greater than that state interest when an individual directly presents his
grievances to a state official. Thus, the state lacks the compelling interest
necessary to maintain the disclosure regulation in light of its deterrent effect
upon individual rights. When money is used only to facilitate communica-
tion to present the merits of one's position, disclosure places a burden on the
ability of individuals to argue their positions effectively. Clearly the use of
money must be characterized according to the probable effect it has on
legislative decision-making. Thus, the focus of the disclosure regulations
should be on the type of expenditure rather than on the amount of money
spent to influence.
150
Expenditures for communication alone do not contain the elements of
improper influence that Chapter 6 seeks to prevent. If other uses of money
are present, however, such as gifts to a legislator or money spent as part of a
coordinated lobbying effort, the considerations are quite different. Thus,
Chapter 6 should require disclosure when money has been used for purposes
beyond direct communication alone. A payment made for the benefit of a
state legislator, whether an outright gift or a more indirect benefit, by an
149. See text accompanying notes 74-81 supra.
150. The Act, as presently written, includes a wide range of expenditures which must be
aggregated to determine whether the $250 amount has been reached. As has been discussed,
this threshold amount can be reached by the inclusion of expenditures made solely for the
purpose of communicating ideas and personal beliefs.
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individual attempting to influence legislative action, may have an effect on
the legislator's decision over and above the merits of the individual's
position alone. A similar result may follow if the Influencer and legislator
have a financial or business relationship with each other. It is important to
expose to public view the potential improper influence inherent in these
situations. A different problem is raised, however, if the individual Influ-
encer makes expenditures under the direction of a lobbyist. In a sense, this
becomes a part of a coordinated lobbying effort since the Influencer, in
essence, becomes an agent of the lobbyist. 151 The Influencer in this case has
become part of a larger scheme to represent the views of the lobbyist's
employer. Thus, the improper influence in this situation flows from the
inability of the legislator to detect the true source of the influencing effort.
If money has been spent for purposes other than the individual's com-
munication, the possibility for improper influence is greatly increased. The
individual that has a financial relationship with or has given gifts to a
legislative official may receive special consideration of his interests in
certain legislative action. Further, expenditures that benefit a legislator do
not involve communication and, therefore, the individual rights of petition
and expression have not been exercised. An individual should be required to
disclose these transactions as an Influencer. Such disclosure does not in-
volve first amendment rights and would benefit both the legislative body and
the public by identifying the sources of possible improper influence. Where
an individual has a financial relationship with an official, it is in the interest
of the public to be aware of this individual's influencing efforts in order to
evaluate the performance of the official as a legislator. In these situations,
the state's interest in disclosure merits great weight. If the Influencer
disclosure regulations were narrowly drawn to confine its coverage to
situations where money is not being spent solely to communicate the views
of the individual, the burden on individual rights would be limited to
situations where the state's interest is compelling.
It has been demonstrated that the state does not have a compelling interest
in requiring an individual Influencer to disclose his identity when expendi-
tures are made in the exercise of the rights of petition and expression. When,
however, expenditures are made for purposes beyond communication, there
exists the potential for improper influence that the state has a substantial
interest in preventing. If the Influencer has a financial relationship with an
official, undue influence may be present and disclosure serves the salutory
purpose of alerting the public to this possibility. Further, an individual
Influencer should not screen from public view the scope of a lobbyist's true
influence. Thus, if the Influencer is acting at the behest of a lobbyist,
151. The term "agent" is used here to connote activity on the part of the Influencer similar
to that covered by CAL. GOV'T CODE §82045(b). This use of the word agent is to be distinguished
from the strict definition of a lobbyist's agent found in 2 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §18239(c).
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disclosure will alert the legislature to the actual source of the influencing
activity. Because Chapter 6 fails to limit the Influencer disclosure require-
ments to situations where the state has a compelling interest in exposing
their identity, Chapter 6 is impermissibly overbroad. Therefore, Chapter 6
should be amended 152 to exclude from regulation those Influencers making
expenditures solely for purposes of direct communication to legislative
officials.
B. Individual Influencing: Indirect Communication
An individual Influencer engaging in indirect influencing efforts is at-
tempting to influence legislative action by urging others to enter into direct
communication with legislative officials. Urging others to directly com-
municate may take diverse forms. It can range from, for example, a full
scale publicity campaign to a more modest effort such as placing newspaper
ads or printing handbills for distribution. An Influencer engaged in indirect
influencing activity is primarily exercising the right of free expression in
making his political beliefs public. The right of petition is also involved
since the Influencer is urging others to contact the legislative officials;
however, free expression is the primary right being exercised.
The Influencer, by engaging in political speech regarding legislative
issues, becomes an active contributor to the market place of ideas. The
exercise of the Influencer's right of free expression serves the public interest
by informing members of the public about matters concerning legislative
policy. A disclosure requirement can chill the free exercise of political
expression, thus limiting political discussion by deterring an individual's
vigorous advocacy of his political beliefs. 15 3 This type of public advocacy
lies particularly close to the purposes of the first amendment.' 54 Considering
the interests served by disclosure of lobbying efforts, 155 it is difficult to see
how this public advocacy could distort the legislature's perceptions of public
opinion. When an individual expresses his beliefs and urges others to act,
there is an independent decision made by each receiver of the communica-
152. An amendment that limits the scope of Chapter 6 would require a statute that is
approved by the electorate. CAL. Gov'T CODE §81012.
153. See text accompanying notes 74-81 supra. A further problem related to the chilling
effect may arise due to possible vagueness in the phrase "soliciting or urging other persons to
enter into direct communication" with specified legislative or administrative officials. CAL.
Gov'T CODE §82045(e). See text accompanying notes 51-52 supra. For text of this subsection
see note 46 supra. To avoid this possible vagueness problem, soliciting and urging will have to
mean the use of express words of advocacy, such as, "support" or "oppose" specified
legislative action by "contracting your representative." See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44
n.52, 79-81 (1976).
154. '[S]peech concerning public affairs. . . is the essence of self-government'.
and the First Amendment must therefore safeguard not only the right of the public to
hear debate, but also the right of individuals to participate in that debate and to
attempt to persuade others to their points of view.
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 193
(1973)(Brennan, J., dissenting), quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64,74-75 (1964)(Bren-
nan, J., dissenting).
155. See text accompanying notes 106-113 supra.
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 8
tion to contact a legislative official. The public's expression of support for
or opposition to a legislative proposal does in fact reflect their true opinion.
This is not the type of "manufactered" or distorted public opinion that will
mislead legislative officials as to the public's opinion on an issue. 156 The
state's interest in identifying the Influencer in order to prevent distortion of
legislative perceptions is not furthered by the disclosure of those expendi-
tures made to communicate with the public. Further, there is no need to
inform the public of the Influencer's identity for the purpose of exposing
improper influence directed at legislative officials since there have not been
any expenditures directed at such officials. The effect of requiring the
Influencer to disclose expenditures made to communicate to the public
would be to identify those individuals expressing their opinions to the
public, thus preventing anonymous speech in the public forum.
Disclosure can have a deterrent effect that stifles free expression; there-
fore anonymous speech deserves protection. 157 Although public expression
of the individual's beliefs or views may in itself be beneficial to the
decision-making process, such a view may be very unpopular or unaccept-
able within the Influencer's own personal or economic community. If an
Influencer is required to disclose his identity when he engages in public
discussion, there is a danger that the fear of reprisal or harassment will cause
him to engage in self-censorship. 5 ' The danger of chill is quite pervasive
and the effects are not limited to individuals or groups advocating ideas
generally considered unpopular. The inability to speak anonymously in the
public forum can greatly burden the exposition and advocacy of ideas that
are needed for effective representative decision-making. Requiring the In-
fluencer to disclose expenditures made to communicate ideas and beliefs to
the public burdens both the Influencer's right of expression and the public's
interest in being informed. An anomalous situation exists when a regulation
attempting to maintain the purity of government actually impedes the speech
necessary to the functioning of a democratic government. The expenditures
made by the Influencer are for purposes of communication only. Thus, the
basic right of free expression is unnecessarily burdened by the disclosure
requirements in Chapter 6.
As with the individual Influencer who directly influences, the indirect
Influencer may not be representing personal beliefs alone, but may be part
of a larger influencing effort. For example, the Influencer may engage in
indirect influencing efforts under the direction of a lobbyist. If the Influ-
encer is being directed by a lobbyist, there would appear to be a state interest
156. A distortion of legislative perceptions occurs when legislative officials are unable to
determine the source of influencing efforts by a particular group and the legislators believe that
public support for or opposition to a proposal is much greater than it in fact is.
157. See Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 63-65 (1960).
158. See, e.g., St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732 (1968); Columbia Broadcasting
Systems, Inc., v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 167 n.17 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
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in requiring disclosure of this relationship in order to expose the actual
influencing activities of that lobbyist. In such case, the Influencer is en-
gaged in activities that extend beyond the expression of personal beliefs; the
state's interest in disclosure of the full scope of a lobbyist's efforts would
increase the need for disclosure by the Influencer. 159 In this type of situa-
tion, the state has a substantial interest in requiring the Influencer to disclose
expenditures made under the direction of a lobbyist, thus the state can
permissibly require such disclosure.
The individual right to engage in political expression lies at the core of the
first amendment. 160 The state must demonstrate a compelling interest to
justify any infringement of that right by disclosure. The interest of the public
in free and open discussion on matters of public importance, particularly
when they relate to governmental policy, is also affected when individuals
refrain from contributing their political views to the market place of ideas.
When an individual Influencer directs his advocacy to the public, the
receiver's decision to accept or reject the Influencer's argument and com-
municate with a legislative body reflect the opinions of that receiver. It
cannot be said that this activity contains the evils of misrepresentation or
distortion of public opinion to the legislative body. If the Influencer is
expressing his own views and beliefs and is not supporting a lobbyist in a
coordinated lobbying effort, there is no state interest in the Influencer
disclosing his activities. There is no compelling state interest in requiring
the Influencer to disclose such indirect influencing efforts. Chapter 6, by
requiring such disclosure, impermissibly regulates in an area protected by
first amendment rights. Chapter 6 should be amended to exclude from
regulation independent individual efforts to advocate in the public forum
specific legislative action for the purpose of generating support for that
individual's position.
C. Associational Influencing: Direct and Indirect Communication
An association may become an Influencer by engaging in the same type of
direct or indirect influencing efforts discussed in relation to the individual
Influencer. 161 Chapter 6 requires an association that becomes an Influencer
to clearly identify its purpose, nature, interests, the legislative action it is
attempting to influence and the expenditures it has made to influence
legislative action. 162 The constitutional questions raised are quite different
159. If an Influencer was allowed to engage in influencing activities supporting or assisting
a lobbyist without being required to disclose, this would, in effect, create a loophole for the
lobbyist. That is, the full extent of the lobbyist's influencing efforts would not be publicly
exposed.
160. See text accompanying notes 115-137 supra.
161. CAL. Gov'T CODE §82045(d), (e).
162. CAL. Gov'T CODE §86109(b), (c), (f). An association that becomes an Influencer must,
of course, comply with all the reporting requirements contained in CAL. GOV'T CODE §86109.
For text of this section, see note 55 supra.
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when an association, rather than an indiviaul, is required to disclose. 163 The
state can legitimately regulate an association by requiring disclosure con-
cerning its structure and activities. 164 The disclosure requirements in Chap-
ter 6, however, interfere with associational rights because they require that
membership be disclosed in two different situations.
In the first situation, an industrial, professional or trade association with
50 or fewer members is required to disclose its membership if the associa-
tion becomes an Influencer. 165 If the association is made up of other
organizations, such as a trade association whose membership is comprised
of other trade associations or companies, there seems to be little problem
with requiring the influencing association to disclose its membership since
individual rights are not involved. 166 Further, disclosure serves the purpose
of preventing the member associations from hiding behind a "front" associ-
ation. For example, companies or associations in the oil industry could form
an association for influencing purposes calling it the Citizens Group for
Energy and hide the true interests represented behind a misleading or
non-descriptive title. The interests represented by professional, trade and
industrial groups are often well-financed lobbying efforts that can result in
the types of improper influence Chapter 6 is designed to expose. 167 Thus,
the state's interest in preventing improper influences and insuring that
monied interests do not distort legislative perceptions of the public support
or opposition regarding legislative action would be subverted if these or-
ganizations were allowed to disguise their influencing efforts behind the
mask of a front group. 168
A more difficult problem is raised if the influencing association is com-
prised of indiviuals from the trades or professions. In this case, the funda-
mental rights of individuals are involved. Thus, requiring disclosure of
individual members must further a compelling state interest. 169 An individu-
al's ability to exercise first amendment rights is not dependent upon the type
of interest that is to be advocated.17 ° Where the association is engaged in
163. The association's standing to claim injury due to the chilling effect of a disclosure
requirement has been limited to situations where the association is asserting the rights of its
members. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
164. See Eisen v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 269 Cal. App. 2d 696, 705, 75 Cal. Rptr. 45,51
(1969).
165. CAL. GOV'T CODE §86109(b)(3). The association must be composed of members from a
particular industry, trade, or profession for this subsection to apply. See 2 F.P.P.C. Ops. 105,
107 (No. 75-169, July6, 1976).
166. For discussions suggesting that individual rights may be asserted by organizations,
specifically corporations, see Moffet v. Killian, 360 F. Supp. 228 (1973); Walden, More About
NOERR-Lobbying, Antitrust And The Right To Petition, 14 U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 1211, 1242-46
(1967); Comment, Freedom of Speech and the Corporation, 4 VILL. L. REV. 377 (1959).
167. See notes 106-114 supra.
168. To allow an Influencer to hide potentially improper influencing efforts behind an
association would result in a failure to inform the public and legislative bodies of important
information. This situation would be analogous to that found should an Influencer escape
reporting activities conducted under the direction of a lobbyist. See note 151 supra.
169. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 464-65 (1958).
170. Id. at 460-61.
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direct or indirect influencing activities, both the public and the legislature
will know the nature, purpose and interests of the association; there is little
reason for identifying individual members. Thus, the disclosure of individu-
al members of an association does not serve the state's interest in disclosing
activities that may result in improper influence.1
71
In the second situation, associational rights are involved not because the
association is required to disclose its membership,172 but because the indi-
vidual members of an association are required to disclose as individual
influencers if they contribute more than $250 to an association for influenc-
ing purposes. 173 If an association is composed of individuals combining to
advocate common interests, requiring a member to disclose his identity as
an Influencer infringes upon that individual's right to associational privacy,
and further interferes with the right to associate for the purpose of political
advocacy.1 74 The right of association enhances effective advocacy by ena-
bling individuals to pool funds used for communication.175 An individual
who is required to disclose his identity if he contributes money to an
association may be inhibited from contributing. The individual's purpose in
channeling his communication efforts through an association may be to
avoid identification. Thus, the association is deprived of necessary funds to
further its direct or indirect influencing efforts. 176 The result of this may be a
reduction in public expression of political beliefs and interests by the
association with a similar reduction in the ability of the association to
petition legislative bodies. The rights of the individual to participate in
effective group advocacy are restricted resulting in a reduction in public
debate. The association must report as an Influencer, therefore the nature
and interests represented by the association will be known. Further disclo-
sure by individual members does not serve the state's interest in identifying
improper influences. The information necessary to make this determination
has already been disclosed by the association. The disclosure of an individu-
al's membership in an association serves only to interfere with an individu-
al's rights to associational anonymity. If the individual has made expendi-
tures beyond contributions to the association that have a potential effect of
improperly influencing legislative decisions, then that individual must re-
port as an Influencer. Where these expenditures are not present, there is no
compelling state interest to require an individual to disclose expenditures in
exercise of his rights of associational advocacy. Therefore, Chapter 6 is
impermissibly overbroad in requiring such disclosure.
171. For a state decision that reaches an opposite result, see Young Americans for Free-
dom, Inc. v. Gorton, 83 Wash. 2d 728, 522 P.2d 189 (1974).
172. CAL. GOV'T CODE §86109(b)(4).
173. CAL. GOV'T CODE §86108(b). This would be an indirect payment to influence legisla-
tive or administrative action.
174. See text accompanying notes 77-81 supra.
175. See note 135 supra.
176. For example, if an individual Influencer has given a gift or bestowed a benefit on a
legislator, the use of money has extended beyond communication of ideas.
Pacific Law Journal I Vol. 8
There seems to be little question that an association which is an Influencer
should report and disclose its influencing activities. It is, however, a
different question when the association is required to disclose its member-
ship. If the individual members are also organizations or associations, the
deterrent effect created by disclosure would not apply since individual first
amendment rights are not involved. When however, the membership is
made up of individuals, the deterrent effect of disclosure may substantially
interfere with the exercise of first amendment rights. Since the association
must disclose its influencing activities, the state does not have a compelling
state interest in requiring the individual to disclose his membership in that
association. Chapter 6 is overbroad by requiring an individual to disclose
and report associational activities and should therefore be amended to
exclude those individuals who merely make expenditures to communicate
through associations.
CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY
In 1972, the California Constitution was amended to create an express
right of privacy.' 77 The California courts have only begun to suggest the
scope of this individual right to privacy. 178 There are, however, privacy
considerations that relate to the Influencer's disclosure and reporting re-
quirements under Chapter 6 that must be examined. First, Chapter 6 requires
the Influencer to disclose certain financial information 179 in a report filed
with the Secretary of State. 180 The California Supreme Court has recognized
a right to privacy in one's financial affairs, adopting a compelling state
interest test to determine when a disclosure of financial information violates
the right to privacy. 181 Therefore, the state must demonstrate a compelling
interest before it can constitutionally require an individual to disclose any
financial information. The disclosure regulation must achieve this interest
by use of the least drastic means.' 82 The regulation requiring that informa-
tion be reported must further the state's interest by requiring the disclosure
of only that information bearing a "rational connection" to the activities
that give rise to the potential harm that disclosure attempts to prevent. 83
Since Chapter 6 requires disclosure of financial information, this constitu-
tional test must be applied.
It has been previously demonstrated that the state has a compelling
interest in the disclosure of those transactions that have the potential for
177. CAL. CONST. art. 1 §1, adopted May 7, 1879, amended November 7, 1972.
178. White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 773, 533 P.2d 222, 233, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94, 105 (1975).
179. CAL. Gov'T CODE §86109.
180. CAL. GOV'T CODE §81005(a).
181. City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Young, 2 Cal. 3d 259, 268, 466 P.2d 225, 232, 85 Cal.
Rptr. 1, 8 (1970).
182. Id.
183. County of Nevada v. MacMillen, 11 Cal. 3d 662, 671, 522 P.2d 1345, 1350, 114 Cal.
Rptr. 345,350(1974); City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Young, 2 Cal. 3d 259,269, 466 P.2d 225,232,
85 Cal. Rptr. 1, 8 (1970).
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creating improper influence. 184 Specifically, those transactions which have
the potential for improper influence include gifts, financial or business
transactions with legislators, payments made for the benefit of legislators,
and payments made under the direction of a lobbyist. The disclosure of this
financial information bears a rational connection to the compelling state
interest in preventing improper influences on the legislative process. 185 The
information that an Influencer must disclose does not violate the individual's
right to privacy and is therefore constitutionally permissible.
The second problem relating to privacy is present because the disclosure
of identity and financial information required by Chapter 6 is embodied in a
public record. 186 Since this record remains public information for an indefi-
nite period of time, the Influencer's activities may be easily pieced together
long after the influencing effort has occurred. Among the purposes of the
privacy amendment was the prevention of the "overbroad. . .retention of
unnecessary personal information by government . ... "187 Disclosure by
the Influencer serves a state interest by informing the public of influences
directed at their representatives. 188 Additionally, disclosure serves the pur-
pose of informing those representatives of the source of influencing efforts
to prevent distortion of the actual public support for or opposition to a
legislative proposal. 189 Therefore, the state interest in disclosure of the
Influencer's identity and financial expenditures should be limited to a
specific period of time that serves the purposes of the Act in exposing
improper influence directed at the legislative process.19° The information
required by Chapter 6, as discussed previously, is closely connected to
activities and relationships that may lend themselves to potential improper
influence. This information bears at least a relevant relationship to the
compelling state interest furthered by the Act. The information is, however,
important only so long as the potential for undue influence remains a threat
to the legislative process. Once the state interest has been served, the
records should be destroyed.
184. See text accompanying notes 155-158 supra.
185. If it is constitutionally permissible for the state to require an Influencer to disclose,
then necessarily the state has established a compelling state interest served by such disclosure.
186. CAL. GOV'T CODE §81005(h), 81008. The public record is available for inspection and
reproduction by anyone. CAL. GOV'T CODE §81008.
187. White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 775, 533 P.2d 222, 234, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94, 106 (1975).
188. See text accompanying notes 107-113 supra.
189. See text accompanying notes 107-113 supra.
190. The length of time that the Influencer's report serves the state interest of identifying
potential improper influence may best be determined by the FPPC, due to the Commission's
expertise in this area. Certainly disclosure should extend beyond the resolution (either passage
or defeat) of the legislative matter that the Influencer attempted to influence, as the effects of
his activities could carry over beyond that point. While the period that report is maintained as a
public record may have to be set somewhat arbitrarily, it should be as short a time as possible.
The old lobbying regulations limited the time a report was kept to two years. CAL. GOV'T CODE
§9904(b) (repealed by Initiative Measure, June 4, 1974). Presently, original reports must be kept
for at least seven years and copies for at least four years. CAL. GOV'T CODE §81009(d), (e).
There is no limitation on how long they may be kept.
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CONCLUSION
There is an inherent conflict present when the state regulates individuals
who attempt to influence the legislative process. On one hand, the state has
a great interest in preventing improper influences that tend to undermine the
representative process. On the other hand, the individual rights that may be
infringed by such a regulation deserve careful protection. The right to
express political beliefs, to petition the government, and to associate for
political advocacy lie at the heart of representative democratic government.
Therefore, a state regulation that tends to inhibit the exercise of these rights
must be carefully drawn to achieve the state interest only to the extent that
the interest furthered is greater than the burden placed on individual rights.
Chapter 6 is California's attempt to prevent improper influence directed at
the state's legislative process. To achieve this purpose, Chapter 6 requires
disclosure by, among others, the Influencer. The Influencer classification
includes a broad range of persons engaged in diverse activities. For the
purpose of analyzing the deterrent effect that disclosure can have on the
exercise of the individual rights of expression, petition and association, this
comment has focused on the Influencer as an individual acting on his own or
in association with others. Strict scrutiny is required when these rights have
been indirectly infringed by a state regulation. The fact that the regulation is
based on the expenditure of money does not reduce this requirement since an
expenditure for purposes of communication does not in itself contain ele-
ments of conduct sufficiently separable from speech. Therefore, a balancing
test is applied to the regulation to determine whether the state's interest
outweighs the burden on individual rights. Further, the state regulation must
be narrowly drawn to achieve the state interest by the least restrictive means.
The use of money to effectively communicate is in most situations a
necessity. It is important to clearly identify the type of influence that money
may exert to determine whether there is a potential for improper influence
directed at legislative decisions. If not otherwise limited, an overbroad
disclosure requirement may have the effect of chilling individual rights
beyond the extent necessary to further a compelling state interest. Attention
was first directed toward an Influencer as an individual directly com-
municating with legislative officials. The individual's rights of petition and
expression are being exercised. The burden placed on these rights by
disclosure was balanced against the state's interest in public disclosure of
the Influencer's expenditures. Where money is used only for purposes of
communication, the possibility of undue influence is so negligible that the
state's interest is insufficient to require disclosure. Where, however, the
Influencer has a financial relationship or has made expenditures to benefit an
official, the possibility that the legislator will consider more than the merits
of the Influencer's position is greatly increased and there is a sufficiently
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compelling interest to justify disclosure of these influencing activities.
Similarly, the state's interest in identifying the extent of the activities of a
lobbyist is sufficiently great to require the individual Influencer to disclose
activities undertaken at the direction or in support of a lobbyist.
Second, the individual Influencer's indirect influencing efforts were dis-
cussed. These efforts are directed at the public to urge others to communi-
cate with legislative officials. The potential for improper influence results
from the distortion of legislative perceptions of public support or opposition
relating to certain legislation. This potential is not present when the Influ-
encer has publicly expressed views or beliefs and relies on the individual
initiative of members of the public to communicate with a legislative body.
To chill such activity does not further the state interest in preventing
improper influence and thus there is no compelling interest present in such
disclosure.
Third, discussion was focused on the associational rights of Influencers.
The activities undertaken may be either direct or indirect influencing efforts,
and the state's interests in the disclosure of associational membership are the
same as when these activities are undertaken by the individual alone. The
association itself may be properly required to disclose its purposes, activities
and interests. The state must, however, show a compelling interest in the
disclosure of the individual members of the association. In cases where the
association must disclose members who are individuals, or in cases where
members are required to report as individual Influencers, the state must have
a compelling interest in publicly disclosing the identity of those individuals.
The interests promoted by disclosure and the burdens placed on individual
rights are the same as discussed in relation to individual Influencers. Where
financial relationships with legislators or coordinated lobbying efforts are
present, the state has a compelling interest in disclosure; otherwise, there is
no substantial interest in individual disclosure.
Finally, the right to privacy in California was discussed in relation to the
required financial disclosure mandated by Chapter 6 and the creation of a
public record that may be used to identify an Influencer's activities long
after they have occurred. When an Influencer may properly be required to
disclose, the financial information reported is relevant to his influencing
activities. The disclosure of this information, then, does not violate the
individual's right to privacy in his financial affairs. The public record
created, however, is not limited to the specific time that the state interests in
disclosure are being promoted by Chapter 6. Once the disclosure has
outlived its usefulness in exposing potential improper influence, the danger
that the record may be used to piece together the political activity of an
individual is present. The prevention of this type of unintended use of
information was a major purpose of the California privacy amendment. The
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public record of political activity required by Chapter 6 should be main-
tained only for the period that the purposes of the Chapter are being
furthered.
The disclosure of Influencer activities, in many cases, serves the state
interest of preventing improper influence directed at the legislative functions
of state government. These regulations, however, should be narrowly drawn
to achieve that interest so that the participation in political activity and
discussion will not be inhibited to an unnecessary extent. Chapter 6 of the
Political Reform Act of 1974 should be amended to exclude from reporting
and disclosure requirements those individual Influencers who make only the
expenditures necessary to effectively exercise their rights of expression,
petition and association. Further, where disclosure does serve the purpose of
exposing potential improper influence, the public record thereby created
should be maintained only as long as it serves that purpose.
Stephen T. Landuyt
